The Roots of Racial Categorization

Abstract

I examine the origins of ordinary racial thinking. In doing so, I argue against the thesis that it is the byproduct of a unique module (e.g. a folk-biology module). Instead, I defend a pluralistic thesis according to which different forms of racial thinking are driven by distinct mechanisms, each with their own etiology. I begin with the belief that visible features are diagnostic of race. I argue that the mechanisms responsible for face recognition have an important, albeit delimited, role to play in sustaining this belief. I then argue that essentialist beliefs about race are driven by some of the mechanisms responsible for "entitativity perception": the tendency to perceive some aggregates of people as more genuine groups than others. Finally, I argue that coalitional thinking about race is driven by a distinctive form of entitativity perception. However, I suggest that more data is needed to determine the prevalence of this form of racial thinking. I conclude by discussing potential ways in which this pluralistic approach will advance our understanding of racial prejudice, racial stereotyping, and the ethics of racial categorization. Face recognition and the visual markers of raceOne belief that is central to folk thinking about race is that the members of different racial groups are distinguished by bodily features, such as skin color and facial physiognomy (see Glasgow, 2009, 69, 119;Hardimon, 2003; Hirschfeld, 1996, 155). The centrality of this belief is reflected in the fact that some individuals are seen as more typical-looking for a given racial group than others (Maddox, 2004, p. 383). For example, Black men are stereotypically thought to have "dark skin tone, broad noses, full lips, and tightly curled hair" (Maddox & Perry, 2018, p. 58).Research has also shown that when a member of a racial group is seen as highly typical for that group, they are subject to more prejudice and stereotyping than other members. Maddox calls this racial phenotypicality bias (Maddox, 2004; see also Maddox & Perry, 2018).The consensus among biologists and race scholars is that there is no non-arbitrary way to sort people according to the visible markers of race (e.g., see Zack, 2002, p. 43). Nonetheless, the belief that visible features are diagnostic of race is still widespread among the folk. Where does this belief come from? In what follows, I argue that the mechanisms responsible for face recognition have a key role to play.

Normative Dehumanization and the Ordinary Concept of a True Human

“…For instance, when people see a political or ideological opponent as belonging to the same racial group as them, they might place them relatively high up on the descriptive dimension, but relatively low down on the normative dimension. Moreover, if people tend to view traits such as intelligence and rationality as central to being human (in descriptive sense), they may view their political and ideological opponents as especially threatening because they perceive them as "entitative" groups who are highly capable of implementing their morally deviant values (see Phillips 2022bPhillips , 2022c. As I explain below, this is arguably how the Nazis tended to think of Jewish people: namely, as humans in the descriptive sense, with traits such as intelligence and rationality, but as subhumans in the normative sense, with traits such as evilness and criminality.…”

Shared intentionality and the representation of groups; or, how to build a socially adept robot

“…There is also evidence that applications of the folk concept GROUP are guided by attributions of shared intentionality. A number of studies have found that entitativity perceptionthe tendency to regard some aggregates of people as more "groupish" than others is mediated by judgments concerning shared intentionality (for some recent discussions, see Phillips, 2021a, b). For example, people's impression that an aggregate of individuals constitutes a genuine group is enhanced when they observe these individuals moving in synchrony Lakens & Stel, 2011;Wilson & Gos, 2019).…”

Entitativity and implicit measures of social cognition

“…To illustrate, consider racial groups again. If the context is such that one is thinking about racial groups in dynamical terms, one's attention will be guided towards certain features (for further discussion, see Phillips, 2020). For example, perhaps one is thinking about tensions between the police force and the African American community.…”

“…For our purposes, the key finding is that in one context, attention to the relevant features can cause people see racial groups as highly entitative; whereas, in a different context, in which attention is not drawn to the relevant features, the same racial groups are not processed as highly entitative (for further discussion, see Phillips, 2021).…”