psychoanalytic listening, Schwaber ( 1981) defines empathy as "that mode of attunement which attempts to maximize a singular focus on the patient's subjective reality, seeking all possible cues to ascertain it" (p. 378). In this mode of listening, one will be attentive to all the cues that will enable one to understand the experience and the subjective reality of the other. For Schwaber, when one is listening to a patient empathically, the basic questions that orient one's listening are: What is the patient's experience? What is the nature of his or her subjective or perceptual reality?According to Schafer (1959), empathy involves "the inner experience of sharing in and comprehending the momentary psychological state of another person" (p. 345). However, he also appears to define empathy much more broadly when he describes it as a sharing and comprehension of "a hierarchic organization of desires, feelings, thoughts, defenses, controls, superego pressures, capacities, self-representations, and representations of real and fantasied personal relationships" (p. 347). We will return to this issue of broad versus narrow conceptions of empathy.Greenson ( 1960), embracing the narrower definition, wrote that "to empathize means to share, to experience the feelings of another person" (p. 148). He stresses the dangers of both inhibited empathy and the loss of control of empathy seen in overidentification with the patient. Both Greenson and Schafer (1959) emphasize the idea of an optimal distance from the patient and the development of an internal working model of the patient as an important guide to empathic responsiveness.In further refining the meaning of empathy, we should perhaps speak about what empathy is not. As has been said many times, empathy is not identical to sympathy. One can understand the feelings, thoughts, and attitudes of another without having sympathy for the person having them. And conversely, one can feel sympathy for another without a deep understanding of that person's subjective reality. According to Schwaber (1981), another thing that empathy is not is "what we would feel if we were in [another's] shoes" (p. 385).' Hoffman (1984) refers to this stance as "egocentric empathy.'' In short, when one takes an empathic stance one tries to understand the other as an experiencing subject, whereas when one takes an external perspective one understands the other as a behaving object.We believe that Schwaber's statement is too strong. Although putting oneself in another's role involves trying to imagine what the other person is feeling, it seems inevitable that one aspect of this process will include one's own imagined feelings and experiences in a similar situation. We implicitly assume that we are sufficiently like the other so that what we would feel in that person's shoes is similar to what he or she feels. (See Basch, 1983, which will be discussed later.) Indeed, empathy is probably facilitated by the greater similarity between two people. 218 EAGLE A N D WOLZTZKY Copyright American Psychological Ass...