Psychiatry and the New Diminished Responsibility Plea: Uneasy Bedfellows?

Abstract

benefit from their own crime 'one consequence of which is that his children have become solely dependent on him' (at [49]).The court reviewed earlier appeals concerned with sentencing decisions of parental child abduction offences. All involved different facts with only one successful appeal for a reduction in sentence. R v Dryden-Hall [1997] 2 Cr App (S) 235 could be distinguished from the present appeals. The appellant was a mother who abducted her child for a period of 21 months, significantly less than in the present cases. She was granted a reduction in sentence as a result of the broken bond between herself and the abducted child. The child no longer wanted a relationship with her. In this respect the harm caused as a consequence of her actions was not as severe to the child and the left-behind parent compared with the present appeals. The Court of Appeal concluded that, following its earlier decision, sentencing decisions for parental child abduction offences require a significant element of deterrence (at [53]). It is therefore unsurprising that both appellants' appeals were dismissed in the present cases. The Court of Appeal's strong stance in these cases of 'outrageous circumstances' is commendable.

Diminished responsibility determinations in England and Wales and New South Wales: whose role is it anyway?

“…In only 11 out of 100 reports, the expert stipulated that the ultimate issue was for the jury.197 As Hallett observes, 'the medicalisation of the Diminished Responsibility defence adds to the role confusion' between legal, medical and normative determinations by 'encourage[ing] psychiatrists to comment on the ultimate issue and to tread on the domain of the jury'.198 This runs the risk that in some cases a verdict will be reached based on who the 'jury find more convincing-the expert testimony provided on behalf of the defence or that provided for the Crown'. 199 The ambit of the role of the psychiatrist was clarified in Brennan: '[w]here there simply is no rational or proper basis for departing from uncontradicted and unchallenged expert evidence then juries may not do so'. 200 The ruling highlights that 'in criminal trials cases are decided by juries, not by experts' but 'juries must base their conclusions on the evidence'.…”