Prudence for Changing Selves

Abstract

What is the prudentially right thing to do in situations in which our actions will shape our preferences? Suppose, for instance, that you are considering getting married, and that you know that if you get married, you will prefer being unmarried, and that if you stay unmarried, you will prefer being married. This is the problem I will deal with in this article. I will begin by explaining why preferences matter to prudence. I will then go on to discuss a couple of unsuccessful theories and see what we can learn from their mistakes. One of the most important lessons is that how you would have felt about a life had you never led it is irrelevant to the question of what you prudentially ought to do. My theory takes this into account. What counts is how you feel about a life when you are actually leading it.

Multi‐Component Theories of Well‐being and Their Structure

“…But I cannot deal with them here. (For some good discussions, see Bykvist, 2006;Rabinowicz, 1989;and Hare, 1989.) 14 Feldman points this out himself (at least with respect to Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism, or 'IAH'): 'No matter how much knowledge, virtue, honor, wealth, health, longevity, loving relationships, etc.…”

“…But I cannot deal with them here. (For some good discussions, see Bykvist, ; Rabinowicz, ; and Hare, . )…”

Denying Services to Prevent Regret

“…If I will be happier as a single person I have reason to stay single, even if I will prefer being married and so regret not having married. 14 If Bykvist is correct, then we can similarly claim that, when providing a service to others, their future attitudes about their circumstances are what matter, rather than future attitudes about the life they could have lived had they chosen differently.…”

Second-Order Preferences and Instrumental Rationality

“…269-270). An effective response to Harsanyi and Dreier may come from Krister Bykvist (2006) who cashes out the concept of desiring (he says "wanting") X more than Y in terms of favoring X more than Y, or disfavoring X less than Y, or favoring X and disfavoring Y, or favoring X and being indifferent toward Y, or being indifferent toward X and disfavoring Y. To favor X, on his view, is to "be positively oriented towards [X] in your actions, emotions, feelings or evaluative responses" (2006, p. 280).…”