Providing Receipt-Freeness in Mixnet-Based Voting Protocols

B, Lee; Boyd, Colin; Dawson, Ed; Kim, Kwangjo; Yang, Jeong-Mo; Yoo, Seung-Jae

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-24691-6_19

Cited by 91 publications

(110 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…The protocol by Lee et al [15] was proven to be Coercion-Resistant (CR) in [7], but does not respect Vote-Independence (V I) -and thus neither V I − P C nor V I − AC -as we show. It is based on trusted devices that re-encrypt ballots and use designated verifier proofs (DVPs) to prove their correct behavior to the voter.…”

Section: Example: Lee Et Almentioning

confidence: 44%

“…The cited protocols [4,10,15,18] illustrate the hierarchy and show that the inverse implications are not true, as discussed below.…”

Section: Cr [15]mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As acknowledged by the authors in their original paper [15], it is possible to copy votes. More precisely, an attacker can access the ballots on the bulletin board before the mixing takes place.…”

Section: Example: Lee Et Almentioning

confidence: 99%

“…that our definitions are strictly stronger than the usual privacy notions) by analyzing the protocol by Lee at al. [15].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Vote-Independence: A Powerful Privacy Notion for Voting Protocols

Dreier

Lafourcade

Lakhnech

2012

Foundations and Practice of Security

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Abstract. Recently an attack on ballot privacy in Helios has been discovered [20], which is essentially based on copying other voter's votes. To capture this and similar attacks, we extend the classical threat model and introduce a new security notion for voting protocols: Vote-Independence. We give a formal definition and analyze its relationship to established privacy properties such as Vote-Privacy, Receipt-Freeness and CoercionResistance. In particular we show that even Coercion-Resistant protocols do not necessarily ensure Vote-Independence.

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Section: Example: Lee Et Almentioning

confidence: 44%

“…The cited protocols [4,10,15,18] illustrate the hierarchy and show that the inverse implications are not true, as discussed below.…”

Section: Cr [15]mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Example: Lee Et Almentioning

confidence: 99%

“…that our definitions are strictly stronger than the usual privacy notions) by analyzing the protocol by Lee at al. [15].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Vote-Independence: A Powerful Privacy Notion for Voting Protocols

Dreier

Lafourcade

Lakhnech

2012

Foundations and Practice of Security

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“…It is well-known that using multi-party computation techniques a strongly secure voting scheme can be built, that achieves all the above ideal properties, but using secure channels between the parties (the voters and/or the authorities): efficient voting schemes that guarantee receipt-freeness or incoercibility [2,4,13,17,18,21] use such secure channels.…”

Section: Contributionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

On Some Incompatible Properties of Voting Schemes

Chevallier-Mames¹,

Fouque

Pointcheval

et al. 2010

Towards Trustworthy Elections

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Abstract. In this paper, we study the problem of simultaneously achieving several security properties, for voting schemes, without non-standard assumptions. More specifically, we focus on the universal verifiability of the computation of the tally, on the unconditional privacy/anonymity of the votes, and on the receipt-freeness properties, for the most classical election processes. Under usual assumptions and efficiency requirements, we show that a voting system that wants to publish the final list of the voters who actually voted, and to compute the number of times each candidate has been chosen, we cannot achieve:-universal verifiability of the tally (UV) and unconditional privacy of the votes (UP) simultaneously, unless all the registered voters actually vote;

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A electronic voting protocol based on blockchain and homomorphic signcryption

Wang

et al. 2020

Concurrency and Computation

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Compared with traditional voting methods, electronic voting can effectively avoid the phenomenon of fraud for personal gains in various links, it is faster and more accurate in the tallying stage. However, many electronic voting systems have many problems such as inability to verify ballots, easy to be forged, and low computing efficiency. We propose an electronic voting protocol based on homomorphic signcryption and blockchain.The protocol makes the voting process public through blockchain and replaces the traditional trusted third party with the smart contract. It uses the homomorphic encryption algorithm and the homomorphic signcryption algorithm to encrypt and sign the ballot and uses their aggregation properties to perform homomorphic tally on the encrypted votes. This not only reduces the excessive burden on the voters but also improves the voting efficiency. At the same time, it can satisfy the security of electronic voting, and the amount of calculation is small, so it is more convenient and flexible to use in large-scale voting.

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Providing Receipt-Freeness in Mixnet-Based Voting Protocols

Cited by 91 publications

References 26 publications

Vote-Independence: A Powerful Privacy Notion for Voting Protocols

Vote-Independence: A Powerful Privacy Notion for Voting Protocols

On Some Incompatible Properties of Voting Schemes

A electronic voting protocol based on blockchain and homomorphic signcryption

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