2006
DOI: 10.1109/tmc.2006.170
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Provably Secure On-Demand Source Routing in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
2
1

Citation Types

0
77
0

Year Published

2008
2008
2016
2016

Publication Types

Select...
5
3

Relationship

0
8

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 133 publications
(77 citation statements)
references
References 15 publications
0
77
0
Order By: Relevance
“…The formal analysis of these protocols has uncovered subtle flaws that are otherwise difficult to identify [15,[22][23][24][25][26]. Moreover, the security of these protocols is evaluated against an active-nm adversary model that prohibits adversaries from sharing an out-of-band channel which rules out wormhole attacks [23].…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…The formal analysis of these protocols has uncovered subtle flaws that are otherwise difficult to identify [15,[22][23][24][25][26]. Moreover, the security of these protocols is evaluated against an active-nm adversary model that prohibits adversaries from sharing an out-of-band channel which rules out wormhole attacks [23].…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…On the other hand, Ariadne [11] and secure routing protocol (SRP) [12] are based on dynamic source routing (DSR) [13] and therefore can be adapted by ad hoc multicast routing protocol (AMRIS) [14]. But vulnerabilities still exist mainly due to the subtle nature of flaws in these protocols [15]. Moreover, the adversary model employed by these secure routing protocols restricts colluding malicious nodes from sharing a hidden/out-of-band channel which rules out wormhole 2 Journal of Computer Networks and Communications attack.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The clever opponent will be seen as -y-x [10] which restrains x opponent nodes and utilizes y adjust identity. In reference [7], Acs et al [5,6,7] proposed an Active-I-2 attack on Ariadne-MAC and an Active-2-2 attack on lowoverhead version of Ariadne-MAC. Moreover, Ariadne struggles with a dispute that in the route answer period every intermediate node cannot check RREPs.…”
Section: Ariadne -Ariadne [16]mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Routing standards for MANETS have been initiated and also various methods have been suggested to safeguard the different ad hoc routing standards like SRP, SAODV, Ariadne, ARAN, SADSR, SEAD and SLSP. Futile attempts have been made to safeguard these standards which are heavily susceptible due to erratic nature of the reserved hosts and deficiency in securing hardware, for which Buttya"n and Vajda [4] and Acs et al [5,6,7]proposed methods to secure them.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This increases the trust management complexity and overhead, in return for stricter identification of the intermediate nodes at the source. endairA [4] takes essentially the same approach, utilizing only public key cryptography, and offers increased resilience to attacks.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%