Protectionism versus risk in screening for invasive species

Abstract

The perception that biosecurity import restrictions are used as disguised barriers to trade is widespread. Despite this perception, there has been little empirical analysis distinguishing genuine attempts to protect against introductions of foreign pests and diseases from attempts to distort trade. In this dissertation, I examine the extent to which enforcement of a biosecurity import standard -US agricultural border inspections for non-indigenous species (NIS) -is used as a disguised barrier to trade.I develop a theoretical model of border inspections that incorporates incentives to protect domestic agricultural producers from import competition as well as incentives to protect against NIS damage associated with agricultural imports. The theoretical model is used to specify an econometric model of border inspection that identifies a parameter representing the implied weight the inspection agency places on domestic producer welfare relative to consumer welfare. The structural model further identifies a parameter representing expected NIS damage as implied by the inspection agency's choice of inspection intensity. I estimate the parameters of the model using a dataset that documents the outcome of US agricultural border inspections.I find evidence suggesting that the inspection agency places greater weight on domestic producer welfare relative to consumer welfare, independent of expected NIS damage. Estimates of the implicit weight on domestic producer surplus range from 1 to 1.63. These results suggest that inspection protocols are implemented in a trade distorting manner to the benefit of domestic producers and at the expense of domestic consumers. I also find evidence that border inspections are influenced by terms of trade motives. The evidence that inspections are not implemented in a least trade distorting manner is independent of expected NIS damage. A second outcome of the econometric analysis is an estimate of expected NIS damage: I find that the inspection agency behaves as if expected NIS damage ranges from $0 to more than $0.25 per dollar of inspected imports.

A Tale of Cyclones, Exports and Surplus Forgone in Australia's Protected Banana Industry

“…Despite this interpretation of the ban as a protectionist device, the official reason given for Australia's banana import ban is biosecurity. The main prior contribution our paper adds to in the literature highlighting the possible link between biosecurity and trade protection is Lawley (2013), who infers a bias in favour of domestic producers over consumers in the actions of the US biosecurity agency from the fact that inspections of Mexican-grown vegetables are more numerous and intensive in periods when those particular vegetables are more expensive. We infer a parallel bias in the Australian case using a different approach, and both of these cases could be viewed as conforming to Etro's (2011, p. 64) assessment that governments 'often hide forms of export promotion behind nationalistic pride'-in this case, pride associated with the supposed purity of their nation's food production environment.…”

Blackleg or blackmail? Economics of the Canada–China canola trade dispute

“…Importing countries have been shown to use inspection standards as nontariff barriers in international food trade (Lawley, 2013). Rather, China may just be applying stricter inspection standards to Canadian canola than in years past.…”

“…Rather, China may just be applying stricter inspection standards to Canadian canola than in years past. Importing countries have been shown to use inspection standards as nontariff barriers in international food trade (Lawley, 2013). Specifically, Lawley (2013) shows that U.S. inspection standards increase when domestic prices faced by import-competing producers fall.…”

“…Importing countries have been shown to use inspection standards as nontariff barriers in international food trade (Lawley, 2013). Specifically, Lawley (2013) shows that U.S. inspection standards increase when domestic prices faced by import-competing producers fall. China could argue that Canadian canola exports have been persistently problematic, but that they are just now applying sufficiently rigorous inspection standards to address the problem.…”

Análise econômica da prevenção e controle do cancro cítrico em São Paulo: uma aplicação da Análise Benefício-Custo

“…Com a intensificação do comércio internacional, através de meios de transportes cada vez mais eficientes, organismos que podem se tornar pragas de forma não proposital, estão rapidamente se movimentando entre os diferentes países. Nos Estados Unidos,Lawley (2008) ressalta que o comércio de produtos é a principal via de introdução de espécies exógenas. agrícola, por exemplo quando se trata de uma praga com alto potencial de disseminação e de danos econômicos.A questão das contas públicas é relevante, particularmente, em dois contextos desta discussão.…”