“Protected Democracies” and Military Guardianship: Political Transitions in Latin America, 1978-1993

Abstract

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. . Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. N 1979, over two-thirds of Latin America's people were living under military rule. By 1993, however, not a single military regime remained in Central or South America or the Spanishspeaking Caribbean. Elected presidents (even if former generals, as in the case of Paraguay's first post-Stroessner government) and legislatures replaced military dictators and juntas. Foreign observers certified the "fairness" of elections in Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Paraguay -even when outgoing military regimes permitted elections only after certain parties or candidates had been excluded from participation. Political parties and opponents of incumbent governments operated openly. Media censorship declined, and fewer cases of politically-motivated abuses of human rights were reported.' "Democratization" seemed to be underway.

Democratization and Civilian Control in Asia

“…For civilians to be able to decide on internal security policy there must be legal provisions and institutional capacities for formulating and adopting these policies, such as a civilian-led ministry of the interior. Most importantly, however, the nonmilitary security forces, law enforcement agencies, and national intelligence apparatus must be separate from the military (Stepan, 1988;Loveman, 1994;Dandeker, 2001). Civilian ability to effectively monitor the military's internal security operations depends on the existence of a framework of norms, procedures, and agencies, such as regular audits of military personnel and judicial supervision of the military, and on the military's acceptance of and cooperation with the oversight regime.…”

“…In fact, compensation strategies can be dangerous as they increase the military's ability to work within the system without supporting the overarching institutions. Moreover, by accepting or extending military prerogatives and forgoing effective control mechanisms, they might reinforce some form of military 'protected democracy' (Loveman, 1994) or 'domain democracy' (Merkel, 2004). …”

“…The military even retained three cabinet posts in the first cabinet of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995Cardoso ( -2002. Yet despite these legacies of military rule, most political scientists have generally considered Brazil a democracy since the transition in 1985, albeit a 'protected' (Loveman, 1994) or 'defective' one (Merkel, 2004: 51). …”

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“…As one of the original members of the UN, the country has sought to reverse its tarnished image from the 1970s and early 1980s when much of the Southern Cone was under military dictatorships (Aguero, 1998;Loveman, 1994;Pion-Berlin, 1992). Uruguay as an emerging or transitional democracy, has refashioned its military from a weapon of the regime to a more civicminded and philanthropic outfit.…”

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“…therefore, the use of such compensation strategies offers a potentially dangerous 'solution' to the problem of military contestation as they provide the opportunity for military officers to work within the system without ever supporting the overarching institutions. furthermore, by granting autonomy on all internal issues and accepting military prerogatives, compensation in fact reinforces some form of "protected democracy" (Loveman 1994) in which the military establishes the rules of engagement in civil-military relations.…”