Democratization and Civilian Control in Asia

Croissant, Aurel; Kuehn, David; Lorenz, Philip; Chambers, Paul

doi:10.1057/9781137319272

Cited by 66 publications

(42 citation statements)

References 121 publications

(194 reference statements)

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“…Since most officers are aware that they cannot expect compliance from enlisted soldiers in killing civilians, mass parties decrease the incentive to stage a coup. (Geddes, 2009: 13) 3 Both types of mechanisms bear high costs: While coercive mechanisms require institutional and financial resources (Croissant et al, 2013;Pilster and Boehmelt, 2012), civilian support, especially the creation of a mass party, is potentially costly as well: The leader needs to reward party activists for their support, but by granting them political offices he loses some control over the political process. This loss of political influence is greater than through power-sharing agreements with the military council (Geddes, 2009: 5).…”

Section: Institution-building As Survival Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Do Military Regimes Institutionalize? Constitution-making and Elections as Political Survival Strategy in Myanmar

Croissant

Kamerling

2013

Asian Journal of Political Science

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In recent years Myanmar underwent drastic political changes. While many see these changes as first tentative steps towards democratization, we argue that the current political transformation is not a deliberate process of liberalization, but a survival strategy of the military regime. Using arguments of the 'new institutionalism' as a theoretical foundation, this article explores the hypothesis that the high degree of professionalization of the Burmese military creates the incentive to institutionalize power-sharing among the ruling elite. Our empirical analysis finds evidence for both a highly professionalized military and institutions that by securing the military's continuing dominance serve the purpose of institutionalizing military power-sharing. These results imply that further democratization is unlikely as it must be initiated from within the still dominating military itself.

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Section: Institution-building As Survival Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Do Military Regimes Institutionalize? Constitution-making and Elections as Political Survival Strategy in Myanmar

Croissant

Kamerling

2013

Asian Journal of Political Science

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“…Literatur utama dalam studi hubungan-sipil militer menyepakati bahwa salah satu prasyarat bagi keberhasilan kontrol sipil atas militer di negara--negara yang bertransisi menuju demokrasi adalah tingkat kohesivitas yang tinggi antar kelompok sipil di dalam pemerintahan demokratis yang berkuasa (Avant 1994;Pion-berlin 1997;Desch 1999;Croissant dkk 2013). Meskipun demikian, prasyarat ini seringkali menimbulkan situasi dilematis ketika transisi demokrasi justru membuka keran kebebasan politik seluas-luasnya.…”

Section: Metode Penel I T I a Nunclassified

“…Dari definisi ini dapat disimpulkan bahwa rekrutmen elite, kebijakan publik, dan keamanan domestik menjadi tiga area kebijakan yang mendesak untuk dikuasai secara penuh oleh pemerintah sipil di negara yang baru mengalami transisi demokrasi. Ketiga area ini berkontribusi besar dengan kualitas nilai-nilai demokrasi seperti kebebasan sipil dan legitimasi pemerintah lewat pelaksanaan pemilu yang jujur dan adil, pelaksanaan program-program pembangunan, serta adanya perlindungan terhadap kebebasan berpendapat oleh aparat penegak hukum (Croissant dkk 2013). Sementara itu, pertahanan nasional dan organisasi militer dianggap tidak berdampak secara langsung terhadap keberlangsungan rezim demokrasi yang baru tumbuh.…”

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Kontrol Sipil atas Militer dan Kebijakan Pertahanan di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru

Gunawan¹

2017

Jurnal Politik

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ABSTRAKArtikel ini berpendapat bahwa upaya pemerintah sipil untuk mendorong perubahan kebijakan pertahanan di Indonesia pasca Orde Baru dilaksanakan melalui mekanisme layering. Secara teoretis, mekanisme layering beroperasi dalam kondisi-kondisi institusional yang menjadi ciri khas dalam konteks transisi demokrasi yaitu besarnya jumlah veto players dalam proses pengambilan keputusan di arena politik dan kecilnya ruang diskresi kebijakan dalam institusi yang dijadikan sebagai target perubahan. Oleh karena itu, perubahan didorong lewat penempatan elemen-elemen baru yang berdampingan dengan status quo yang berlaku di sebuah institusi. Melalui analisa deskriptif terhadap kebijakan MEF (Minimum Essential Force) tahap I tahun 2010-2014 ditemukan bahwa penggunaan mekanisme layering lewat kebijakan MEF telah berhasil diimplementasikan tanpa adanya penolakan dari para pendukung status quo di sektor pertahanan Indonesia. Kondisi ini dimungkinan karena program modernisasi alutsista (alat utama sistem persenjataan) yang menjadi inti dari kebijakan MEF memberikan insentif tambahan terhadap status quo yang sesuai dengan preferensi TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia) mengenai keberlanjutan organisasi mereka. Akan tetapi tulisan ini juga melihat adanya efek negatif dari penggunaan mekanisme layering tersebut yakni rendahnya derajat kepatuhan terhadap elemen baru perubahan. Sebagai akibat dari tetap utuhnya status quo, militer mempertahankan dominasinya dalam proses formulasi dan implementasi tanpa pengawasan efektif dari kalangan sipil. Dalam kasus MEF, kondisi ini menimbulkan inkonsistensi kebijakan yang kemudian dapat menghambat profesionalisme TNI ke depan serta memberikan celah bagi kembalinya TNI ke ranah politik praktis.Kata kunci: kontrol sipil, layering, status quo, MEF ABSTRACT This article argues that civilian government effort to establish policy change on the defense sector in post-New Order Indonesia has been conducted through the so-called layering mechanism. Theoretically, layering mechanism operates in typical conditions found in transition democracy i.e. large number of veto players and lower discretion of interpretation/implementation in the targeted institution. Thus, establishing change is conducted by adding new elements alongside the existing status quo elements. By using descriptive analysis on the MEF (Minimum Essential Force) policy in the period of 2010-2014, this article finds that the application of layering mechanism through MEF policy was relatively free from resistance by the status quo defenders in Indonesia's *Penulis adalah Dosen di Program Studi Ilmu Politik Universitas Bakrie dan kandidat doktor ilmu politik di Ruprecht-Karls-Universitat Heidelberg, Jerman. 198JURNAL POLITIK, VOL. 2, NO. 2, FEBRUARI 2017 defense sector. This was made possible since weapon modernization program that serves as the core of MEF policy adds new incentive towards the existing status quo, which conforms to military preference regarding its organizational survival. Nevertheless this article highlights detrimental eff...

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“…Civilian leaders can opt to sanction, counterbalance and monitor the military, that is, demand changes to its institutional behaviour and framework (Croissant et al 2013). Alternatively, politicians may appease, acquiesce and appreciate military leaders, buying their cooperation but compromising on reforms.…”

Section: Military Organisation: Institutional Businesses and Politicamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In particular, this article builds on the work of Croissant et al (2013), who concentrate on the strategies civilians must use in order to strengthen their control of the armed forces. In their attempts to consolidate their power over the military, civilian leaders can choose from a menu of options, ranging from 'robust' strategies of sanctioning, counterbalancing and monitoring to the 'weak' strategies of appeasement, acquiescence and appreciation (Croissant et al 2013, p. 55).…”

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confidence: 99%

Successful and failed democratic transitions from military rule in majority Muslim societies: the cases of Indonesia and Egypt

Mietzner

2014

Contemporary Politics

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Democratization and Civilian Control in Asia

Cited by 66 publications

References 121 publications

Why Do Military Regimes Institutionalize? Constitution-making and Elections as Political Survival Strategy in Myanmar

Why Do Military Regimes Institutionalize? Constitution-making and Elections as Political Survival Strategy in Myanmar

Kontrol Sipil atas Militer dan Kebijakan Pertahanan di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru

Successful and failed democratic transitions from military rule in majority Muslim societies: the cases of Indonesia and Egypt

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