Proscription’s Futures

Goede, Marieke de

doi:10.1080/09546553.2018.1432219

Cited by 10 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…Most of the court's assessments have in fact focussed on procedural aspects. 63 As highlighted by the literature, both the Kadi saga 64 as well as the Hamas case 65 illustrate this.…”

Section: The Materials Commission Of a Terrorist Act: A Matter Of Evi...mentioning

confidence: 93%

Who is really affected by European Union terrorist sanctions? A Critical Study on ‘Proximity’ in EU Case Law

Lonardo,

Datzer,

Walde

2024

EERR

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The European Union (EU) adopts restrictive measures – or sanctions – as part of its counterterrorism strategy. These measures restrict the fundamental rights of the natural or legal persons they target and can be challenged in front of the General Court or the European Court of Justice (the CJEU). Drawing from both legal scholarship and security studies, this article refines an analytical framework that enables an original analysis of the case law of the CJEU: we focus on ‘proximity’, an element so far neglected in the analysis of counter-terrorism sanctions. Proximity is the variable measuring the distance between the addressee of a measure from the actual commission of a terrorist act. Such a variable provides the analytical framework through which to test the hypotheses and findings proposed in the last decade by previous studies. Such findings are mostly confirmed by our interdisciplinary analysis, but nuanced. While it is true that sanctions lead to a process of othering and stigmatization, the Court has introduced some meaningful procedural safeguards that contribute to protecting the fundamental rights of individuals, especially in the case of family members of suspected terrorists. Not dissimilarly from what was noted about judicial protection in other sanctions regimes, however, tensions remain in how to ensure effective substantive, as opposed to merely procedural, protection to sanctions addressees. Terrorism, EU restrictive measures, Court of Justice of the European Union, fundamental rights, judicial protection

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“…Most of the court's assessments have in fact focussed on procedural aspects. 63 As highlighted by the literature, both the Kadi saga 64 as well as the Hamas case 65 illustrate this.…”

Section: The Materials Commission Of a Terrorist Act: A Matter Of Evi...mentioning

confidence: 93%

Who is really affected by European Union terrorist sanctions? A Critical Study on ‘Proximity’ in EU Case Law

Lonardo,

Datzer,

Walde

2024

EERR

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“…Despite not carrying out any terrorist acts in the EU, the LTTE was blacklisted in 2006. This decision is widely believed to be a political decision backed by the United Kingdom and India (De Goede 2018). In 2017, the EU court removed the LTTE from the list, but the EU reiterated that the LTTE remained blacklisted.…”

Section: Determinants Of Terrorist Designationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Determinants of Terrorist Listing

Lee

Tominaga

2023

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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Terrorist designation has increasingly become an important counterterrorism tool used by intergovernmental organizations and state governments. This article examines the determinants of terrorist listing and argues that terrorist listing is driven by security as well as political concerns. While countries tend to designate groups that pose a greater security threat, terrorist listing can also be influenced by interstate relationships including alliance ties and state rivalry. We test these arguments using a dataset on 35 countries that currently maintain their own lists of designated terrorist organizations. Our findings show that governments are more likely to list groups that have a record of attacking their domestic interests. Domestic groups are more likely to be designated than foreign groups. Moreover, countries are more likely to designate groups that are designated by their allies, even when these groups do not pose a direct threat. Our study contributes to the literature on terrorism and more broadly international security by systematically examining the determinants of terrorist designation and explaining the heterogeneity of terrorist lists across countries.

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“…As Jarvis and Legrand (2016, 2018) and De Goede (2018) have noted, proscription as a counter-terrorism measure has been neglected in the scholarly literature. The work that has explored this phenomenon in the security literature has mainly focused on the constitutive question regarding proscription; on how and why proscription regimes have come about (Jarvis and Legrand, 2016, 2017, 2018).…”

Section: Studying the Effects Of Proscription On Peacementioning

confidence: 99%

The ‘linguistic ceasefire’: Negotiating in an age of proscription

Haspeslagh

2020

Security Dialogue

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Villains need to be de-villainized for talking to begin; this is a cornerstone of negotiation literature. But what happens when villains are proscribed, or listed as terrorists? While an emerging body of work has started to explore the effects of proscription by emphasizing aspects of demonization and banishment, it has not so far explored how banishment ends. This article offers a theoretical and empirical contribution to this discussion by exploring the effects of proscription on the dynamic interaction between conflict parties and how negotiations still do take place with armed groups listed as terrorists. To do this it maps representations made by the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia through a qualitative discourse analysis of 335 statements triangulated with 50 personal interviews. The article argues that proscription makes the initiation of negotiations impossible because it leads to a form of extreme vilification. This is especially true for the government, unable to switch directly to de-vilifying its proscribed enemy. First it has to normalize its vilification – a concept I describe here as a ‘linguistic ceasefire’. This helps explain how banishment can end and peace negotiations can be initiated in an age of proscription.

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Proscription’s Futures

Cited by 10 publications

References 11 publications

Who is really affected by European Union terrorist sanctions? A Critical Study on ‘Proximity’ in EU Case Law

Who is really affected by European Union terrorist sanctions? A Critical Study on ‘Proximity’ in EU Case Law

The Determinants of Terrorist Listing

The ‘linguistic ceasefire’: Negotiating in an age of proscription

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