``Global warming is now a weapon of mass destruction. It kills more people than terrorism, yet Blair and Bush do nothing.'' Houghton (2003)`N ow the invasion is upon us, surely we can delay no longer. We need to go at the task [of climate change] as though we are mobilising for war. In an unnecessarily great hurry.'' Leggett (2007) Imagining the worst The apocalypse looms ever nearer. Irreversible climate change, the threat of global terrorism, conflicts and wars over declining natural resources, the mobile avian flu carried by migratory birds, all resound to the fears prevalent in political and popular discourse in the 21st century (at least in the`developed world'). Whichever threat is conceived most pressing, there is a shortage of time in which to act, an immensity of tasks to accomplish, and the absolute necessity of taking precautionary action to prevent the very worst. The threats are both ultimately manageable with the relevant action, but also feared to be inherently unstable and potentially catastrophic, requiring precaution and investments in risk modelling. Managing the global future is legitimated under conditions of`extreme uncertainty' with these`total threats' that are, for Swyngedouw (2007), vague, ambiguous, but homogeneous. The presumed apocalyptic potential of contemporary threats thus underpins the call for precautionary, or preemptive, political action. The`precautionary principle' has become a central element of environmental politics, where it is increasingly accepted that regulatory action must be taken even if scientific evidence concerning the imminence and precise nature of threats remains disputed (Majone, 2002, page 90; Sunstein, 2003, pages 1005^1008). This principle, put simply, holds that``uncertainty is no excuse for inaction against serious or irreversible risks, [and] that absence of evidence

This paper critically analyses the importance of risk management techniques in the war on terror. From the protection of borders to international financial flows, from airport security to daily financial transactions, risk assessment is emerging as the most important way in which terrorist danger is made measurable and manageable. However, we argue that the riskbased approach results in the displacement of risk onto marginal groups, while its effectiveness in the war on terror remains questionable.

Transactions after 9/11: the banal face of the preemptive strike Amoore, L.; de Goede, M. General rightsIt is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). Disclaimer/Complaints regulationsIf you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: http://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible. Transactions after 9/11: the banal face of the preemptive strike Louise Amoore* and Marieke de Goede** This paper argues that the deployment of transactions data of many kinds has become the banal face of the war on terror's preemptive strike. Because the failure to predict and prevent 9/11 is partly thought to be a failure to 'connect the dots' of available intelligence, post 9/11 policies seek to register, mine and connect ever more 'dots', or association rules, in the form of credit card transactions, travel data, supermarket purchases and so on. We argue that it is in these ordinary transactions that another spatiality of exception is emerging, one in which the traces of habits, behaviours and past practices become the basis of security decisions to freeze assets, to apprehend, to stop and search or to deport. As such, these developments constitute a relatively unacknowledged violence in the war on terror, which is in need of critical questioning.key words war on terror transactions surveillance pre-emption political geography privacy

In the context of the 'war on terror', techniques of imagining the future have taken on new political significance. Richard Grusin has coined the term 'premediation' to describe the way in which news media and cultural industries map and visualize a plurality of possible futures. This article examines the relation between the politics of risk and premediation as a security practice. Premediation simultaneously deploys and exceeds the language of risk. Its self-conscious deployment of imagination in security practice feeds economies of both anxiety and desire.

No abstract

No abstract

Increasingly, private companies – including Twitter, airlines, and banks – find themselves in the frontline of fighting terrorism and other security threats, because they are obliged to mine and expel suspicious transactions. This analytical work of companies forms part of a chain, whereby transactions data are analysed, collected, reported, shared, and eventually deployed as a basis for intervention by police and prosecution. This article develops the notion of theChain of Securityin order to conceptualise the ways in which security judgements are made across public/private domains and on the basis of commercial transactions. Drawing on the work of Bruno Latour, this article understands the security chain as the set of practices whereby commercial transactions are collected, stored, transferred, and analysed, in order to arrive at security facts. Understanding the trajectory of the suspicious transaction as a series of translations across professional domains draws attention to the processes of sequencing, movement, and referral in the production of security judgements. The article uses the chain of financial suspicious transactions reporting as example to show how this research ‘thinking tool’ can work. In doing so, it aims to contribute to debates at the intersection between International Relations (IR) and Science-and-Technology Studies (STS).

In the midst of the war on terror and unilateral US security politics, many observers look to Europe for alternatives. It is argued that Europe is particularly opposed to preemptive security practice, and prefers instead to rely on the rule of law. This article examines the meaning of preemption in the war on terror, and analyses three aspects of European counter-terror policy. It becomes clear that, with respect to a number of policies that play a key role in preemptive security practice, including criminalizing terrorist support, data retention, and asset freezing, the European Union is world leader rather than reluctant follower. Instead of relying on images that position Europe as inherently critical of preemptive security, debate concerning the legitimacy and desirability of such practices must be actively fostered within European public space.