2002
DOI: 10.1257/000282802762024539
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Property Rights and Finance

Abstract: Which is the tighter constraint on private sector investment: weak property rights or limited access to external finance? From a survey of new firms in post-communist countries, we find that weak property rights discourage firms from reinvesting their profits, even when bank loans are available. Where property rights are relatively strong, firms reinvest their profits; where they are relatively weak, entrepreneurs do not want to invest from retained earnings.

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Cited by 789 publications
(308 citation statements)
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References 17 publications
(4 reference statements)
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“…In line with the four studies discussed above, in a study based on entrepreneurship based on transition countries in Eastern Europe, Johnson et al (2002) find that the insecurity of property rights may be a key factor deterring entry in the small firm sector. North has argued that insecure property rights result in using technologies that employ little fixed capital and that firms will typically be small (North 1990, p. 65).…”
Section: Hypothesessupporting
confidence: 61%
“…In line with the four studies discussed above, in a study based on entrepreneurship based on transition countries in Eastern Europe, Johnson et al (2002) find that the insecurity of property rights may be a key factor deterring entry in the small firm sector. North has argued that insecure property rights result in using technologies that employ little fixed capital and that firms will typically be small (North 1990, p. 65).…”
Section: Hypothesessupporting
confidence: 61%
“…Safavian, Graham andGonzalez-Vega (2001, p. 1220) Anecdotal evidence on whether managers answer this way is mixed. Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff (2002, p. 1337-1338 report one respondent told an interviewer that he understood that the question was really asking about his own firm. During field interviews in Zambia, however, when asked whether bribes were sometimes needed (i.e., question J7) several managers explicitly noted that although they do not pay bribes-often giving reasons why they do not-they know other firms do (Note 4).…”
Section: Asking Firms About Corruptionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…131 See Johnson et al (2002) who investigates new firms in the post-communist countries. 132 Bandiera (2003), and Milhaupt and West (2000).…”
Section: Taxationmentioning
confidence: 99%