Property Rights and Economic Growth: An Empirical Study

Torstensson, Johan

doi:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1994.tb02257.x

Cited by 128 publications

(81 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…1 Institutionalist writers on economic development stress the importance of secure property rights (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005;Barro, 1997;North, 1981North, , 1990Torstensson, 1994). But it is argued here that the concept of property is often inadequately defined in economics.…”

Section: G E O F F R E Y M H O D G S O Nmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Much of the ‘economics of property rights’ devalues property and legal rights

Hodgson

2015

Journal of Institutional Economics

133

114

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Abstract. Legal theorists and other commentators have long established a distinction between property and possession. According to this usage adopted here, possession refers to control of a resource, but property involves legally sanctioned rights. Strikingly, prominent foundational accounts of the 'economics of property rights' concentrate on possession, downplaying the issue of legitimate legal rights

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Section: G E O F F R E Y M H O D G S O Nmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Private ordering is vital but insufficient. The cross-country evidence of Barro (1997), Torstensson (1994) and others suggests that economic growth is correlated with the rule of law, among other factors (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Much of the ‘economics of property rights’ devalues property and legal rights

Hodgson

2015

Journal of Institutional Economics

133

114

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“…Der Planer Mao hat Mises ' (1927, 19) Einsicht, daß " die freie Arbeit unverhältnismäßig ergiebiger sei als die von Unfreien verrichtete Arbeit" weder gekannt noch geahnt. Die Zentralverwaltungswirtschaft aber ist nur der Extremfall.Ökonometrische Studien zeigen, daß wirtschaftliche Freiheit und der Zuwachs wirtschaftlicher Freiheit, also weitgehender Planungsverzicht 18 , das Wirtschaftswachstum fördern (Beach/Davis 1999, 10;de Haan/Siermann 1998;de Haan/Sturm 2000;Edwards 1998;Goldsmith 1997;Gwartney/Lawson/Block 1996, 109;Knack 1996;Knack/Keefer 1995;Pitlik 2002;Torstensson 1994).…”

Section: Planung Auf Der Verfassungsebeneunclassified

Evolution und Planung: Überlegungen zur Wirtschafts- und Friedensordnung

Weede¹

2003

Analyse &Amp; Kritik

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Although individuals cannot desist from planning, social processes cannot be commanded and controlled successfully. The shortcomings and disadvantages of holistic planning and the likelihood of plan failure can be explained: Scattered knowledge can be mobilized, innovation and effort can be elicited only where planning does not displace economic freedom and competition. The positive effects of freedom and competition and the negative effects of constraining plans can be demonstrated empirically. But freedom and competition require an institutional framework. There is no need to leave the establishment of this framework only to evolution because evolution does not necessarily lead to efficient solutions. That is why some kinds of planning may have a useful, though modest role to play at the rule-making level. Since planners remain fallible in planning constitutions and institutions, competition and some room for evolution remain desirable at this level, too.

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“…While research shows that institutions are important determinant economic growth [1]- [3], there is evidence showing no link between institutions and economic growth [4]. A ubiquitous number of studies in the 1990's have discovered a strong positive impact of institutional development on macroeconomic stability, such as growth and low level of inflation [5]- [7].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutional Quality and Inflation

Salahodjaev¹,

Chepel²

2014

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The purpose of this paper is to empirically analyze the effects of the quality of institutions on inflation. Using panel data from 1991 to 2007, we find that increase in institutional development which is measured by the ratio of domestic credit to private sector to GDP has significant and sizeable effect on inflation. This paper finds that in countries with high inflation rates, financial sectors cannot resist current levels of inflation and banking system does not decrease inflation in the environment where private banks and financial companies have adapted to existing monetary environment.

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Property Rights and Economic Growth: An Empirical Study

Cited by 128 publications

References 24 publications

Much of the ‘economics of property rights’ devalues property and legal rights

Much of the ‘economics of property rights’ devalues property and legal rights

Evolution und Planung: Überlegungen zur Wirtschafts- und Friedensordnung

Institutional Quality and Inflation

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