Properties in sight and in thought

Ivanov, Ivan

doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02509-x

Cited by 2 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…Finally, following Ivanov (2021, Section 2.2), you might claim that a perceptual experience represents a property whenever it enables you to attend to a property and to track it through changes of appearance. There is a potential for circularity here: The claim that you are attending to and tracking a specific property may presuppose that your experience represents it.…”

Section: An Argument Against Property Illusionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Instead, following Ivanov (2021, Section 2.2), you might claim that you perceive the boat's light redness because you can attend to and track the boat's light redness. For instance, Macpherson (2020) says that, while wearing the dark glasses, “your experience will allow you to track” the boat's color “and other colours in a wide variety of situations” (p. 7).…”

Section: Purported Examples Of Property Illusionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Accordingly, I will ignore such higher-order illusions from this point forward. 3 See, for example, Macpherson and Batty (2016), O'Callaghan (2017), Alford-Duguid (2020), Macpherson (2020), Ivanov (2021), and Mehta (Unpublished, Chapter 2). 4 See, for example, Johnston (2006Johnston ( , 2014, Macpherson andBatty (2016), andMacpherson (2020).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Misperceiving properties

Millar

2022

Mind & Language

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Recently, a number of philosophers have argued that property illusions-cases in which we perceive a property, but that property is not the property it seems to us to be in virtue of our perceptual experience-and veridical illusions-cases in which we veridically perceive an object's properties, but our experience of some specific property is nonetheless unsuccessful or illusory-can occur. I defend the contrary view. First, I maintain that there are compelling reasons to conclude that property illusions and veridical illusions can't occur; and second, I maintain that the considerations supporting the possibility of such cases are uncompelling.

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Section: An Argument Against Property Illusionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Purported Examples Of Property Illusionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Misperceiving properties

Millar

2022

Mind & Language

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Perceptual attribution and perceptual reference

Quilty‐Dunn

Green

2021

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Perceptual representations pick out individuals and attribute properties to them. This paper considers the role of perceptual attribution in determining or guiding perceptual reference to objects. We consider three extant models of the relation between perceptual attribution and perceptual reference--all attribution guides reference, no attribution guides reference, or a privileged subset of attributions guides reference--and argue that empirical evidence undermines all three. We then defend a flexible-attributives model, on which the range of perceptual attributives used to guide reference shifts adaptively with context. This model underscores the remarkable and dynamic intelligence of our perceptual capacities. We elucidate implications of the model for the boundary between perception and propositional thought.

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Properties in sight and in thought

Cited by 2 publications

References 24 publications

Misperceiving properties

Misperceiving properties

Perceptual attribution and perceptual reference

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