‘Propaganda Fights’ and ‘Disinformation Campaigns’: the discourse on information warfare in Russia-West relations

Baumann, Mario

doi:10.1080/13569775.2020.1728612

Cited by 29 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…It should be added that the model of informational influence by evoking and increasing extreme (most often negative) emotional states is a tool of psychological influence that has been used continuously and improved for decades and has been used first by Soviet and later Russian information centers (Baumann, 2020;Hejlová and Klimeš, 2019;Myers, 2015). There were many scientific centers in the Soviet Union improving so-called social control engineering to evoke and direct social moods and, if necessary, the behavior of crowds (Monica, Nicolae, and Breban, 2010).…”

Section: Research Results and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thus, gaining the opportunity to influence Warsaw's political decision-making process allows influencing Brussels and Washington's foreign policy, leading to mutual animosities or the non-conflicting pursuit of specific interests. In the pessimistic variant, taking control of Warsaw would significantly weaken American influence in this part of Europe and guarantee the possibility of a strong influence on Brussels' internal decision-making process (Baumann 2020;Götz 2016;Götz 2017).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Geopolitical Strategy of the Russian Federation in Relation to the Epicenter of the Visegrad Group on the Example of Poland in the COVID-19 Pandemic

Bielawski¹,

Górnikiewicz²,

Magierski³

et al. 2020

ERSJ

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Purpose: An attempt to determine the possibility of using the global epidemic's state to implement geopolitical objectives by the Russian Federation on the example of Poland in the wider context of international geopolitical conditions around the Visegrad Group. Design/Methodology/Approach: The paper uses mainly source texts and the content of expert interviews conducted at the turn of 2019/2020. The collected empirical data were then processed using theoretical methods such as analysis, synthesis, and comparison to formulate conclusions using deductive and inductive inference methods. Findings: It has been confirmed that in their foreign policy, the decision-making centers of the Russian Federation are willing to take advantage of the situation of the global epidemic to achieve their own geopolitical goals concerning other countries. Practical Implications: This study may be used in scientific and expert work on the Russian Federation's foreign policy in the COVID-19 era. Originality/Value: Lack of comprehensive scientific studies dedicated to implementing the Russian Federation's geopolitical objectives during the COVID-19 2019/2020 epidemic.

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Section: Research Results and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Geopolitical Strategy of the Russian Federation in Relation to the Epicenter of the Visegrad Group on the Example of Poland in the COVID-19 Pandemic

Bielawski¹,

Górnikiewicz²,

Magierski³

et al. 2020

ERSJ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Some have focused on the composition of actors involved and highlighted the contingencies of construction of HW as a security and political issue (Daniel and Eberle, 2018; Monsees, 2020; Ördén, 2019; Szostek, 2020), while others explored systemic responses to disinformation (Bjola and Papadakis, 2020; Wagnsson, 2020). A growing number of studies also dig into the political dimension of HW discourse and its entanglement with identity (re)construction of international organisations or particular countries (Baumann, 2020; Eberle and Daniel, 2019; Mälksoo, 2018). Adopting a Critical Security Studies perspective, we side with works that problematise the understanding of the problem as a single and coherent story (Monsees, 2020; Ördén, 2019).…”

Section: The Rise Of Hw Discoursementioning

confidence: 99%

Speaking of hybrid warfare: Multiple narratives and differing expertise in the ‘hybrid warfare’ debate in Czechia

Daniel¹,

Eberle²

2021

Cooperation and Conflict

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What do we speak of when we speak of ‘hybrid warfare’, a notion that has become prominent in discussions of European security? The article shows that this question is difficult to answer, as the hybrid warfare discourse is not only vague, but also consists of multiple, and at times contradictory, narratives. While talking and writing about supposedly the same thing, participants in the hybrid warfare debate often suggest markedly different ideas about the precise nature and target of the threat, offer different responses and draw upon different expertise. Grounding our argument in critical scholarship on narratives, security knowledge and hybrid warfare, we build a framework for studying security narratives around the four elements of threat, threatened value, response and underlying knowledge. This framework is utilised in a case study of Czechia, a country that has played a pioneering and outsized role in European hybrid warfare debates. We identify three narratives of hybrid warfare – defence, counterinfluence and education – which present markedly different understandings of ‘hybrid warfare’, and ways to defend against it. Our intervention hopes to contribute to disentangling the contradictions of the hybrid warfare discourse, itself a necessary precondition for both sound state policy and an informed public debate.

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“…Previous research has sought to provide a clearer picture by studying the threat, focusing directly on practices: cases of disinformation, (antagonistic) strategic narratives and fake news (e.g. Mejias andVokuev 2017, Ziegler 2018), or the practice of "information warfare" (Baumann 2020) or "hybrid warfare" (Jonson and Seeley 2015, Renz 2016). We instead propose a bottom-up approach, focusing on threat perceptions in a democratic society.…”

Section: How To Grasp the Problem With Projection Of Harmful Informatmentioning

confidence: 99%

What is at stake in the information sphere? Anxieties about malign information influence among ordinary Swedes

Wagnsson

2020

European Security

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Scholars, states and organisations have warned that authoritarian regimes and other hostile actors are projecting information to inflict harm upon others. Yet, there is little agreement on the nature of this threat. This is mirrored in the plethora of labels in use, ranging from "disinformation" to "sharp power" and "information warfare". In order to investigate this menace further, we turn our focus to ordinary people's anxieties, since a better understanding of threat perceptions will also provide a better understanding of the problem. We conducted a comprehensive case study comprising focus group discussions (n: 97) and an extensive survey (n: 2046) among Swedish citizens. We asked: To what extent do people worry about information influence and why? What can this tell us about the nature of this problem or threat? The empirical results suggest that respondents were first and foremost worried about societal cohesion and democracy. They also identified a risk that information influence can undermine trust in societal institutions and the EU. Based on our findings, we suggest that "malign information influence" is an appropriate label to be used in future research. Finally, we propose directions for future systematic research on how malign information infuence is received and processed in different national contexts.

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‘Propaganda Fights’ and ‘Disinformation Campaigns’: the discourse on information warfare in Russia-West relations

Abstract: The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the published version of record.

Cited by 29 publications

References 26 publications

Geopolitical Strategy of the Russian Federation in Relation to the Epicenter of the Visegrad Group on the Example of Poland in the COVID-19 Pandemic

Geopolitical Strategy of the Russian Federation in Relation to the Epicenter of the Visegrad Group on the Example of Poland in the COVID-19 Pandemic

Speaking of hybrid warfare: Multiple narratives and differing expertise in the ‘hybrid warfare’ debate in Czechia

What is at stake in the information sphere? Anxieties about malign information influence among ordinary Swedes

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