1996
DOI: 10.2307/136216
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Promotions and Incentives in Partnerships: Evidence from Major U.S. Law Firms

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Cited by 29 publications
(14 citation statements)
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“…Because competition for promotions in U.S., Japanese, and Danish firms (Ferrall, 1996;Xu, 1997;Ericksson, 1999;Bognanno, 2001) has a tournament structure, gender differences in behavior under tournament incentives may explain gender disparities among top management in large corporations. These gender differences are significant.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Because competition for promotions in U.S., Japanese, and Danish firms (Ferrall, 1996;Xu, 1997;Ericksson, 1999;Bognanno, 2001) has a tournament structure, gender differences in behavior under tournament incentives may explain gender disparities among top management in large corporations. These gender differences are significant.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…7 See Ferrall (1996), pp. 814-815, for an example where the form of the advancement function P s (· · ·) is explicitly derived given additional assumptions on the information structure of the game.…”
Section: Equilibriummentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Recently, several papers have estimated structural models of tournament models, as is done in this paper. Ferrall (1996Ferrall ( , 1997, estimates structural models of internal labor markets within, respectively, law firms and engineering firms. 2 Zheng and Vukina (2007) estimate a rank-order tournament model using the Knoeber and Thurman (1994) data, and use the estimated structural parameters to simulate outcomes under an alternative cardinal compensation scheme.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Using the model, they showed that increases in the gap between the winner's and loser's rewards will increase the performance of tournament participants and that with risk-neutral homogeneous workers; tournaments induce an efficient allocation of resources. 3 Much of the empirical research on tournaments follows the framework first laid out by Lazear and Rosen and it can be usefully divided into two categories: tests of whether a particular payment scheme has a tournament structure (Gibbons and Murphy, 1990;Main et al, 1993;Chan, 1996;Ferrall, 1996;DeVany and Walls, 1997;Xu, 1997;Errickson, 1999;Bognanno, 2001) and tests of the behavior under tournament incentives.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%