2007
DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2006.10.001
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Promoting helping behavior with framing in dictator games

Abstract: A number of recent papers on double-blind dictator games have obtained significant generous behavior when information regarding the recipient or any other social context is provided. In contrast, the lack of information discourages other-regarding behavior and the subject's behavior closely approximates the game-theoretic prediction based on the selfishness assumption. This paper uses framing to explore the role of helping behavior in dictator games. The whole experiment includes both classroom and regular exp… Show more

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Cited by 155 publications
(98 citation statements)
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References 12 publications
(21 reference statements)
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“…The mean of the 20 randomly selected female allocations was 3.2 and the standard deviation 1.73, whereas the mean male allocation was 2.45 and the standard deviation 1.96. For more details see Brañas-Garza (2007).…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The mean of the 20 randomly selected female allocations was 3.2 and the standard deviation 1.73, whereas the mean male allocation was 2.45 and the standard deviation 1.96. For more details see Brañas-Garza (2007).…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Since dictators have no incentives to give money, a payoff-maximising dictator would donate nothing. For this reason, dictators' donations are taken as a measure of individual's altruism, or inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt (1999); Bolton and Ockenfels (2000); Brañas-Garza (2006, 2007; Charness and Gneezy (2008)). …”
Section: Subject Poolmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Therefore, the higher number of friends they would list, the lower the chance of bene…ting any particular one. 7 Given our speci…c elicitation protocol, we may be capturing the network of people who would like to bene…t each other. As a result, we do not capture links to friends whom our subjects would not like to see bene…ted, while we might capture links to people our experimental subjects would like to bene…t without being friends.…”
Section: Stagesmentioning
confidence: 99%