We report on a two-stage experiment in which i) we first elicit the social network within a section of undergraduate students and ii) we then measure their altruistic attitudes by means of a standard Dictator game. We observe that more socially integrated subjects are also more altruistic, as betweenness centrality and reciprocal degree are positively correlated with the level of giving, even after controlling for framing and social distance, which have been shown to significantly affect giving in previous studies. Our findings suggest that social distance and social integration are complementary determinants of altruistic behavior

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.. Oxford University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Quarterly This paper builds a bridge between the two existing approaches for wage and employment determination in a unionized market: the monopoly union model and the efficient bargaining model. Both fail to capture the dynamic aspects of wage bargaining. When the repeated nature of the wage bargaining process is considered, the equilibria are neither as inefficient as the monopoly union model predicts nor as fully efficient. Rather, the two models can be regarded as particular cases with certain discount rates. We apply our model to issues such as the endgame interpretation of the U. S. steel industry, wage concessions, and featherbedding. *We thank Olivier Blanchard, Ramon Caminal, Lawrence Katz, Randy Kroszner, Lawrence Summers, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support from Gobierno Vasco and from The Korea Foundation for AdvancedStudies is gratefully acknowledged. 1. However, the monopoly union model does not fully fit the wage bargaining observed in practice. Firms and unions bargain about the wage (the wage is not simply imposed by the union), although firms retain the right to manage the employment level. See Nickell [1982] and Nickell and Andrew [1983] for the "right to manage model." ? 1989 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

This study revisits different experimental data sets that explore social behavior in economic games and uncovers that many treatment effects may be gender-specific. In general, men and women do not differ in “neutral” baselines. However, we find that social framing tends to reinforce prosocial behavior in women but not men, whereas encouraging reflection decreases the prosociality of males but not females. The treatment effects are sometimes statistically different across genders and sometimes not but never go in the opposite direction. These findings suggest that (i) the social behavior of both sexes is malleable but each gender responds to different aspects of the social context; and (ii) gender differences observed in some studies might be the result of particular features of the experimental design. Our results contribute to the literature on prosocial behavior and may improve our understanding of the origins of human prosociality. We discuss the possible link between the observed differential treatment effects across genders and the differing male and female brain network connectivity, documented in recent neural studies.

MCQ examinations are frequently used but there is no consensus as to whether a penalty for wrong answers should be used or not. For example, in some countries examinations for medical licensing include MCQ sections with penalty while in others there is no penalty for wrong answers. We contribute to this discussion with the analysis of the effects of penalties. In a partial knowledge model there is a trade-off between bias and measurement error that is affected by the level of penalties. We build on IRT and introduce students' optimal behavior. Our simulations indicate that the optimal penalty may be relatively high: even though it discriminates against risk averse students this effect is small compared with the measurement error that it prevents.

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