2012
DOI: 10.1016/j.cie.2011.11.029
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Profit allocation mechanisms for carrier collaboration in pickup and delivery service

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
3
1
1

Citation Types

0
51
0

Year Published

2015
2015
2022
2022

Publication Types

Select...
5
2

Relationship

0
7

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 106 publications
(51 citation statements)
references
References 19 publications
0
51
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Liu et al (2010) directly incorporate the marginal contributions of players as weights into the EPM formulation. Dai and Chen (2012) draw attention to allocations in the core with the property that the greatest deviation from the Shapley value is minimum. Finally, Vanovermeire et al (2013) and Lozano et al (2013) discuss the different outcomes of various solutions in transportation contexts via numerical examples.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Liu et al (2010) directly incorporate the marginal contributions of players as weights into the EPM formulation. Dai and Chen (2012) draw attention to allocations in the core with the property that the greatest deviation from the Shapley value is minimum. Finally, Vanovermeire et al (2013) and Lozano et al (2013) discuss the different outcomes of various solutions in transportation contexts via numerical examples.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…where formulas (16) and (17) are used to update both the velocity and position for pickup services and formulas (18) and (19) are used to update both the velocity and position for delivery services. 1 and 2 are two acceleration coefficients.…”
Section: Ga Updates and The Corresponding Pso Operationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In logistics network cooperation, game theoretic methods are usually applied to model participants' behaviors in different scenarios and evaluate their contribution to the coalition as well as the proportion of allocated profits [19,20]. Hernández and Peeta [21] evaluated the influences of collaboration mechanism on carriers and explored the differences with noncollaborative environments.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Chan and Zhang used a simulation methodology to evaluate the impact of collaborative transportation [45]. Dai and Chen developed three profit allocation mechanisms for the carrier collaboration problem [46]. Lozano et al employed a cooperative game theory to allocate benefits for different transportation companies [47].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%