Productive specialization, peaceful cooperation and the problem of the predatory state: lessons from comparative historical political economy

Boettke, Peter J.; Candela, Rosolino A.

doi:10.1007/s11127-019-00657-9

Cited by 58 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 66 publications

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“…Depending on the governance model and moral qualities of international management, it can both strengthen and weaken state capacity. Boettke and Can dela proved this statement on the examples of privatization in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, as well as the consequences of the political unification of Sicily with the Ital ian peninsula after the Napoleonic wars [19].…”

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confidence: 83%

“…They do not act as the main limiter of the opportunities that open up for international management in the chosen gov ernance model. For this reason, as Boettke and Candela claim, in each of the examples of Russia and Italy that they examined, the political and economic transition, aimed at ensuring clear ly defined and strictly observed property rights, reduced the state capacity of these nations instead of raising it [19].…”

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confidence: 99%

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Governance models in the globalization era: from moral to political responsibility

Filipchuk¹,

Malkina²,

Kolyukh³

et al. 2020

Nauk. visn. nat. hirn. univ.

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Purpose. To study the role and significance of the moral responsibility of international management in governance models under conditions of global economy and democracy. Methodology. The authors use structuralfunctional, institutional, and comparative methods as well as the methods of synthe sis and analysis. findings. The authors examined and proved the key statement of the study. Modern international management is a holistic corporate governance culture. The foundations of leadership and professional qualities of modern international management are their moral qualities. In democratic governance models, the moral qualities of management turn into political responsibility and ensure the quality of management, the growth of state capacity of Ukraine, the formation and promotion of national interests in the face of global threats and challenges. originality. The authors prove that the main determining actor in the governance model is international management charac terized by stable moral qualities. Only in this case, a governance model will achieve the highest efficiency and ensure the growth of state capacity, as well as the promotion of national interests in the face of global threats and challenges. Practical value. The results of the study can be used to improve the legislative framework as well as to develop the educational programs for international management education. The experience of international management education under consideration, as well as the use of moral responsibility in the behaviour patterns of international management, will ensure the quality of gover nance, the growth of Ukrainian state capacity and the promotion of national interests in the global economy and democracy.

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confidence: 83%

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confidence: 99%

Governance models in the globalization era: from moral to political responsibility

Filipchuk¹,

Malkina²,

Kolyukh³

et al. 2020

Nauk. visn. nat. hirn. univ.

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“…The property institutions literature has broadly identified the systemic characteristics that give economic actors sufficient certainty to engage in costly development 5 . One important characteristic is sufficient military capacity to secure property against outsiders (Batchelder and Freudenberger, 1983; Geloso and Salter, 2020); administrative and enforcement capacity to define and enforce property institutions for those who want them (Arruñada and Garoupa, 2005); and political constraints to ensure the government's promises to respect property institutions are credible (Boettke and Candela, 2020; Candela, 2020). Furthermore, the development of property institutions requires that political decision-makers are residual claimants with at least some incentive to protect property (Leeson and Harris, 2018; McChesney, 1990).…”

Section: The Political Economy Of State Predation and The Evolution Of Property Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The chronic uncertainty of American Indian property rights

Alston

Crepelle

Law

et al. 2021

Journal of Institutional Economics

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Property institutions should ideally provide economic actors with certainty that their local choices about investment will not be unsettled by shifting political economic equilibria. We argue that for this to occur, political autonomy, administrative and enforcement capacity, political constraints, and accessible legal institutions are each necessary. A comparison of the evolution of property rights for settlers and American Indians in the United States shows how political and legal forces shape the evolution of property institutions. American Indians, who had property institutions before Europeans arrived, could not defend their land from Europeans and later Americans due to lacking military capacity. Settlers' property rights were relatively secure because the government had sufficient autonomy and capacity to broadly define and enforce their rights, political institutions constrained the government from expropriating settlers' property, and legal institutions provided a forum for settlers to adjudicate and defend their rights in court. Native Americans, in contrast, had systematically inconsistent and often expropriative policy treatment by the government. Although tribes have technically been sovereign since the 1970s, tribal governments continue to lack sufficient political and legal autonomy and capacity to define and enforce property institutions in response to evolving local conditions.

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“…On the other hand, if I take preferences as given and look into the relevant constraints and the relative prices faced in making my choices and explain why in some instances I might choose tea instead then I have started to offer an explanation rather than a description. This is a theme to which I will come back at the end of this paper, but if our theories in political economy ultimately completely turn on initial conditions to determine the equilibrium exhibited, than I would argue that we haven't offered an explanation at all, just a description of the situation (Boettke and Candela, 2019).…”

Section: The Socialist Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Property, predation and socialist reality

Boettke

2019

Journal of Institutional Economics

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Economics as a social science is about exchange and the institutions within which exchange relationships are formed and transactions are executed. Yoram Barzel's contribution to economics and political economy reflect this focus on exchange and institutions. In this paper, I will sketch a theory of real-existing socialist economies from a property rights/public choice perspective. Then I present the puzzles in political economy that such a system confronted in attempting to create a prosperous, regenerating and competitive economic system. I then conclude with a short discussion of the future for a progressive research program in political economy that takes institutional change seriously.

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Productive specialization, peaceful cooperation and the problem of the predatory state: lessons from comparative historical political economy

Cited by 58 publications

References 66 publications

Governance models in the globalization era: from moral to political responsibility

Governance models in the globalization era: from moral to political responsibility

The chronic uncertainty of American Indian property rights

Property, predation and socialist reality

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