Process-Tracing as a Tool to Analyse Discretion

Abstract

IntroductIonAs a heuristic device, the principal-agent model's main contribution lies in its ability to offer tools to simplify complex realities relating to the reasons for and consequences of the delegation of powers to agents. At least, that is how the model has traditionally been introduced. However, theoretical parsimony has been bought at a relatively high theoretical and empirical cost. Although principal-agent models have been theorized for decades, the causal processes in between acts of delegation and agency discretion and autonomy are still not developed theoretically, with a large degree of opacity about how the model's elements are causally connected. 1 Instead, most uses of the principal-agent model focus on comparing input (preferences of principals and agents) with realized policy outcomes. However, by doing so, they black-box the actual process whereby agents potentially exploit their delegated powers for private gains. Yet just because there is a correlation between what agents want and achieved outcomes does not mean that delegation resulted in agency costs. When a principal does not complain about its agent, existing

twenty years of principal-agent research in EU politics: how to cope with complexity?

“…In the absence of manifestly activated control, it is not easily distinguished whether an agent acts in line with the principal's preferences because of self-interest or because it seeks to avoid control by its principal. Process-tracing methods in an in-depth case study design can then be useful to dissect an agent's motivationsor more generally to lay bare the causal mechanisms to lead to a specific effect (Reykers and Beach, 2017). Processtracing has also been proposed in constructivist research as a method to european political science: 17 2018 twenty years of principal-agent research in EU politics distinguish preference change due to strategic adaption in the light of altered incentives from preference change occurring through persuasion and socialization (Checkel and Moravcsik, 2001: p. 224).…”

“…However, identifying the clear-cut act of delegation in instances of micro-delegation in the EU is in many cases more challenging. When the Council Secretariat prepares draft proposals for intergovernmental negotiations on behalf of the member states (Reykers and Beach, 2017), or when the Commission represents the member states in the G8 (Niemann and Huigens, 2011), the act of delegation is certainly less formal and often implicit. Irrespective of the extent to which the act of delegation is formalized, its mere existence is essential to conceive a social or political relationship as a principal-agent relationship.…”

Studying the influence of national parliaments in EU affairs: reconnecting empirical research and the Principal-Agent approach

“…The first challenge is 'observational equivalence'. This problem 'arises when a perceived absence of (formal) control or conflict between Principal and Agent can be explained as either a case of extreme Agent autonomy or near perfect Principal control' (Damro 2007, 887;Delreux and Adriaensen 2017;Reykers and Beach 2017). As Saalfeld (2005) puts it, a lack of visible control in the parliament does not necessarily mean that parliaments abdicate in controlling their governments.…”

The unseen hands: Collaborative instrumental leadership in the British renegotiation case

“…For this, we build on insights from principal‐agent theorising and the collaborative governance literature. We contribute to this literature by presenting a theoretical model that unpacks the informal process between the initial delegation to EU institutions and the eventual policy measures being adopted (Reykers & Beach : 258–259; Stone Sweet & Thatcher : 24). We then provide a process‐tracing case study of the British renegotiation.…”