Probing System Limits: Decentralisation and Local Political Accountability in Vietnam

Abstract

Decentralisation occupies an important space in debates over public-sector reform in doi moi Vietnam. This article assesses the changing distribution of roles, responsibilities and resources across levels of government over the past decade. Vietnam is incrementally transfering greater administrative and fiscal responsibilities to the provincial level. In addition, the Communist Party is attempting to prevent local corruption through a much touted "grassroots democratisation" initiative. Yet such moves towards decentralisation, however cautious, are problematic in terms of their bureacratic politics and potential impacts on poverty. Incentives for bureacratic actors and local leaders to transfer meaningful control downwards are weak or non-existent within the current governance structure, which centralises political power and emphasises hierarchical, sectoral controls over decision-making and resources. And decentralisation trends are exacerbating the weak administrative and fiscal capacities of poorer provinces, threatening to reinforce rather than reduce Vietnam's widening regional and rural-urban disparities. A more proactice role for the centre in redistributing resources, providing technical support and establishing a facilitative policy framework will be crucial if decentralisation is to contribute towards improved socioeconomic outcomes in Vietnam's poorest regions. In existing and necessary future arrangements, requirements and asociated mechanisms of accountability are of key significance.

Coordination and health sector adaptation to climate change in the Vietnamese Mekong Delta

“…The Doi Moi reforms were instituted by the Government of Vietnam, beginning in 1981, to transition from a centrally planned to a market-based economy (Irvin 1995). The decentralization process was accelerated in the year 2000, when the Vietnamese National Assembly resolved to transfer responsibilities from central to local governments wherever possible (Fritzen 2006). The World Bank (2015) reported that fiscal decentralization has been successful, but Vu (2012) observed that the decentralization reforms are not meeting government expectations, and described a top-down decentralization in Vietnam, with government functions devolved on the basis of tasks for which higher levels of government should not be responsible.…”

An Analysis of Quasi-Decentralized Budgeting in Vietnam

“…Fritzen (2006) contends that the greater decentralization inherent in the Law can worsen fiscal capacities of poorer provinces and reinforce regional disparities; and Beresford (2008) states that local revenue-raising is highly regressive. Apparently some provincial and district officials believe that officials at the commune level have insufficient skills and, therefore, give them little budgetary discretion; but, as Fritzen (2005b) argues, this may lead to disappointing implementation of community-based infrastructure programs.…”

Fiscal Decentralization, Fiscal Incentives, and Pro-Poor Outcomes: Evidence from Viet Nam

“…�iscal decentrali�ation is defined today as allowing lower levels of government to raise and/or spend an increasing share of the state budget (Fritzen 2006). Fiscal decentralization also determines the discretion given to regional and local governments to determine their expenditures and revenues (both in aggregate and detail).…”