1999
DOI: 10.1006/redy.1999.0069
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Privatizing Social Security

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Cited by 40 publications
(24 citation statements)
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“…3.1, the peaks are only one period later, because young individuals in the PAYG 23 The government in the PAYG country may decide to implement the pension reform in this way for political economy reasons. For example, when it is assumed, as in Cooley and Soares (1999), that a reform is only implementable in case it is welfare-improving for a majority of the current population. 24 More details and a formal proof of this result are given in Appendix B.2.…”
Section: Results 5 In Case There Is Full Compensation For the Elderly mentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…3.1, the peaks are only one period later, because young individuals in the PAYG 23 The government in the PAYG country may decide to implement the pension reform in this way for political economy reasons. For example, when it is assumed, as in Cooley and Soares (1999), that a reform is only implementable in case it is welfare-improving for a majority of the current population. 24 More details and a formal proof of this result are given in Appendix B.2.…”
Section: Results 5 In Case There Is Full Compensation For the Elderly mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Political economy arguments could also play a role for implementing such a reform policy. Cooley and Soares (1999), for example, argue that privatizing a PAYG system is only politically feasible in case a transition policy uses debt to finance the benefits during the transition period, shifting at least part of the cost to future generations. Therefore, in this and the next subsection, we assume that while contributions to the PAYG scheme fall permanently at t = 0, benefits are kept constant in that period.…”
Section: Compensationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…5 For simulations with no mortality risk, the annual discount parameter, β, varies and has been set between 1 and 0.96 (as examples, see [34][35][36]). While some empirical estimates for the risk aversion parameter, σ, have exceeded 6, simulation values for σ tend to stay in the range of 1 to 5, deemed a plausible range by economists [28,[34][35][36][37][38]]. The discount rate and level of risk aversion were varied in an attempt to calibrate the model, so that agents upon entry into the labour market prefer voluntary sickness insurance coverage that lasts between three and seven years.…”
Section: Saving Over the Lifecycle With Sickness Riskmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Other quantitative political economy models of social security reforms includeCooley and Soares (1999) as well asGalasso (1999), among others.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%