Privatization and Public–Private Partnerships for Local Services

Savas, E. S.

doi:10.1081/e-epap2-318

Cited by 168 publications

(271 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…Taking other governance mechanisms into account -hostile takeovers, large shareholders and CEO incentives, and so on -corporate governance research cannot be said to have shown particularly robust results ( Becht et al 2003 , p. 83) A relatively large literature addresses the impact of public and private ownership in the contexts of both monopoly and competition in the management of waste. For example, Savas (2000) asserts that the best way of organizing garbage collection is to divide the jurisdiction into appropriate sections and organize competitive bidding for the sections from private fi rms and municipal agencies. The meta-study of Domberger and Jensen (1997) suggests that most frequently reported cost reductions from contracting out are between 10 to 30 per cent.…”

Section: Empirical Studies On Public Ownershipmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Dispersed Public Ownership Impair Efficiency? The Case of Refuse Collection in Norway

Sørensen

2007

Public Administration

104

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Corporate governance theory suggests that companies with dispersed and indirect ownership suffer from agency costs. A worst case is where several political authorities jointly own a company, which allows managers to operate with inferior efficiency. In political economy, the manager is not the major agency problem. Elected politicians may impair efficiency to improve their re‐election prospects. Since politicians have less influence in jointly owned firms, such companies are expected to perform better than those owned by a single public authority. Consistent with corporate governance – but not political economy – the empirical analysis suggests that dispersed municipal ownership impairs cost efficiency. In the Norwegian case of municipal refuse collection presented here, costs of dispersed ownership often outstrip gains from economies of scale. Use of jointly owned companies is not necessarily a proper response to efficiency problems inherent a fragmented local government structure.

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Section: Empirical Studies On Public Ownershipmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Dispersed Public Ownership Impair Efficiency? The Case of Refuse Collection in Norway

Sørensen

2007

Public Administration

104

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“…The past decade of devolution and government reform in the United States has prompted an explosion of government contracting and a shift in the locus of control for program delivery, blurring the traditional boundaries among governments, private companies, and nonprofit organizations. Governments at all levels have expanded the range of services they deliver through contracts-from traditional "make or buy" decisions for defense weaponry, highway construction, and fleet purchases, to contracting for the ongoing provision of specialized social services (GAO 2002;Salamon 2002;Savas 2000;Sclar 2000). Increasingly, government workers find themselves managing contracts instead of delivering services (Freundlich and Gerstenzang 2002;Kettl 2000), often in the context of diverse expectations such as reducing the size and cost of government, improving service delivery, and increasing accountability.…”

Section: Contracting For Social Servicesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Traditional market models of contracting-models that influence many government contracting decisions-assume contractors are disciplined by market forces such as competition, the ease of sellers' access to the contract market, and the ready and inexpensive availability of relevant contractor performance information. Accountability under such conditions relies on the market to ensure desirable behavior (Savas 2000). In his typology of contracting, Sclar (2000) calls this a "complete" contracting environment.…”

Section: Effective Contract Accountabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

State Social Services Contracting: Exploring the Determinants of Effective Contract Accountability

Romzek¹,

Johnston²

2005

Public Administration Review

204

159

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This article examines the effectiveness of contract accountability in social service contracts. The analysis is based on five case studies of Kansas contracts for selected welfare, Medicaid, and foster care and adoption services. Results indicate the state has achieved moderate to high levels of accountability effectiveness, especially in terms of specifying social service contracts and selecting appropriate accountability strategies. However, accountability is undermined by the use of risk shifting, reliance on a system of multiple competing providers, and the adoption of new information technologies. These conclusions contradict the conventional wisdom, theory, and existing research on contracting.

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“…The expansion of 'third-party government' (Posner 2002;Salamon 2002) profoundly challenges the democratic governance of public services. As 'New Public Management' and 'Reinventing Government' reforms strive for greater efficiency and cost effectiveness, public services and functions are rapidly being contracted out to private contractors (Donahue 1991;Savas 2000). New frontline service providers and organizations replace public bureaucrats and agencies.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

New Forms of Administrative Law in the Age of Third‐party Government

Benish

Levi‐Faur

2012

Public Administration

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This article explores the democratic values underlying public services when they are outsourced. Building on Rosenbloom and Piotrowski's (2005a, 2005b) framework, we examine whether and how administrative law norms – that serve as central democratic governance and accountability mechanisms in the administrative state – are extended to the new (private) frontline service providers. Through a study of the regulation of the privatized welfare‐to‐work programme in Wisconsin, we find that new forms of administrative law are evolving in third‐party government. These forms differ from administrative law as it usually applies to public agencies in several important aspects. The findings highlight the active role of legislative and administrative mechanisms in the promotion of these new forms of administrative law; and they shed light on the transformations that administrative law norms undergo in the age of third‐party government.

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Privatization and Public–Private Partnerships for Local Services

Cited by 168 publications

References 2 publications

Does Dispersed Public Ownership Impair Efficiency? The Case of Refuse Collection in Norway

Does Dispersed Public Ownership Impair Efficiency? The Case of Refuse Collection in Norway

State Social Services Contracting: Exploring the Determinants of Effective Contract Accountability

New Forms of Administrative Law in the Age of Third‐party Government

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