Does Dispersed Public Ownership Impair Efficiency? The Case of Refuse Collection in Norway

Sørensen, Rune J.

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9299.2007.00681.x

Cited by 104 publications

(100 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…Applying public choice theory results in a prediction in the opposite direction (Sørensen 2007). In this view, citizens are unable to effectively monitor their elected administrators, who will exploit this by using public resources to further their own interests (rent seeking).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intermunicipal cooperation, public spending and service levels

Allers

Greef

2017

Local Government Studies

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Local governments can increase size in particular policy fields through cooperation with other local governments. This is often thought to improve efficiency, but there is little empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis. We study the case of the Netherlands, which has been a veritable laboratory of intermunicipal cooperation (IMC), using panel data for 2005-2013. We find no evidence that IMC reduces total spending of the average municipality. Indeed, IMC seems to increase spending in small and large municipalities, leaving spending in mid-sized municipalities unaffected. In one specific field, tax collection, spending may be reduced through IMC. Spending in this field is low, which may explain why total spending is unaffected. Instead of lowering spending, municipalities may have used possible cost savings as a result of IMC to improve public service levels. We do not find evidence substantiating this hypothesis, however.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intermunicipal cooperation, public spending and service levels

Allers

Greef

2017

Local Government Studies

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“…Th e hypothesis for this variable is a negative correlation, which is also confi rmed by a number of the studies mentioned above (for example Bel and Costas 2006;Sørensen 2007;Bel and Mur 2009;Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2013;Zafra-Gómez et al 2013;Gradus et al 2014, etc. ).…”

Section: Mikušovámentioning

confidence: 69%

Local Governments and Local Waste Management in the Czech Republic: Producers or Providers?

Soukopová¹,

Klimovský²

2016

NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy

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Local governments are responsible for the delivery of a large variety of very different public services. Th e article is focused on two issues: 1) we try to discover whether the local governments in the Czech Republic prefer to be "producers" or "providers" of the waste-collection services; 2) we test and compare the effi ciency of "production" and the effi ciency of "provision", and for this purpose we take into account various factors, inter alia inter-municipal cooperation, the existence of hybrid organizations, economies of scale etc. A main goal is to fi nd out what the local governments in the Czech Republic prefer if they decide on the delivery of local services linked to waste management and what factors are the most important ones from the perspective of their potential infl uence on effi ciency. Concerning the data, we analyse linked open data on municipal solid waste expenditure collected by the Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic and data relating to features of waste collection obtained via a questionnaire-based survey which was carried out at the turn of 2015 -2016. Th e results of the presented analysis show a clear relationship of dependence between the inter-municipal cooperation and the relevant costs, and it confi rms the assumption that the Czech local governments undoubtedly prefer the position of "providers" in the fi eld of the local waste management. Paradoxically, the results show that neither internal nor external provision of waste-collection services is a key factor of cost-effi ciency.

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“…To make matters worse, agency theory suggests an additional problem: dispersed ownership (Sørensen 2007). Public services provided through IOs are financed from a common pool; hence, the costs are shared with other municipalities.…”

Section: Theory and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intermunicipal cooperation, municipal amalgamation and the price of credit

Allers

Ommeren

2016

Local Government Studies

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In many countries, local government size is increasingly thought to be insufficient to operate efficiently. Two possible solutions to this problem are amalgamation and intermunicipal cooperation. This paper applies a novel methodology to shed light on the efficiency implications of this choice. Using a unique and rich micro-level dataset, we find that intermunicipal organisations (IOs) in the Netherlands consistently pay higher interest rates than municipalities, while there is no economic reason to do so. We interpret this as a form of inefficiency. Municipal amalgamation, on the other hand, does not result in higher interest rates. Our analysis eliminates one possible explanation, dispersed ownership of IOs, as the number of partners cooperating in an IO does not affect interest rates (no 'law of 1/n'). This leaves the introduction of extra hierarchical layers as a result of cooperation, and the ensuing reduction in monitoring, as the most probable explanation.

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Does Dispersed Public Ownership Impair Efficiency? The Case of Refuse Collection in Norway

Cited by 104 publications

References 32 publications

Intermunicipal cooperation, public spending and service levels

Intermunicipal cooperation, public spending and service levels

Local Governments and Local Waste Management in the Czech Republic: Producers or Providers?

Intermunicipal cooperation, municipal amalgamation and the price of credit

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