Private-to-private Corruption

Argandoña, Antonio

doi:10.2139/ssrn.685864

Cited by 67 publications

(92 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…In addition, they support the realization of anti-corruption measures. A positive signal that may also contribute to a corruption-aversive subjective norm is the cooperation with other companies, governments, employers' organizations, and non-governmental organizations in the fight against corruption (e.g., Argandoña, 2003;Kubal et al, 2006;McDonald, 2000;Stead et al, 1990).…”

Section: Managerial Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To create a corruptionaversive attitude, it is necessary that ethical behavior is reinforced and corrupt behavior is punished. Additionally, performance evaluations and the associated rewards have to be tied to ethical behavior (e.g., Argandoña, 2003;Cole and Smith, 1996;McDonald, 2000;Stead et al, 1990).…”

Section: Managerial Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The purpose of this is to heighten the employees' awareness of the risks in committing corrupt actions. It is not sufficient to set high penalties, but the consequences of corrupt action for the individual have to be clearly stressed in speeches, guidelines, newsletters, anti-corruption campaigns, trainings, and seminars (e.g., Argandoña, 2003;McDonald, 2000).…”

Section: Managerial Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Understanding Corruption in Organizations – Development and Empirical Assessment of an Action Model

2008

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Despite a strong sensitization to the corruption problem and a large body of interdisciplinary research, scientists have only rarely investigated which motivational, volitional, emotional, and cognitive components make decision makers in companies act corruptly. Thus, we examined how their interrelation leads to corruption by proposing an action model. We tested the model using a business simulation game with students as participants. Results of the PLS structural equation modeling showed that both an attitude and subjective norm favoring corruption led to a desire to act corruptly. Given high perceived behavioral control, this desire was transformed into an intention that finally resulted in corrupt action. Components related to general private and professional goals did not allow for any prediction. Based on these results, we discuss preventative measures and methods for combating intra-and inter-organizational corruption.

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Section: Managerial Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Managerial Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Managerial Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Understanding Corruption in Organizations – Development and Empirical Assessment of an Action Model

2008

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“…36 Here we are not referring to measures that companies may take to tackle the phenomenon of ''grand'' corruption, but only to facilitating payments. For measures that companies may take against corruption see Argandoña (1999Argandoña ( , 2003, Transparency International (2002), Hess and Dunfee (2000), Vincke and Heimann (2003). 37 Any such decision should be independent of the attitude of the authorities, the media etc.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…7 In the political sphere, public corruption is considered much more important than private corruption, even though both are important and serious. See Argandoña (2003) on private corruption. 8 This distinction is particularly relevant in the legal sphere in connection with the OECD Convention and the consequent extension of the criminalisation of corruption to actions affecting public officials and politicians of other countries.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Corruption and Companies: The Use of Facilitating Payments

Argandoña

2005

J Bus Ethics

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Corruption and sustainable development: The impact on income shifting in European international groups

Marchini

Mazza

Medioli

2019

Corp Soc Responsibility Env

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Corruption is a proxy of low detection of opportunistic behavior and may influence managers' decisions. Considering an international scenario, the study investigates whether income shifting between subsidiaries and parents is emphasized for subsidiaries in less corrupted countries. Data refer to groups with the parent company in France, German, Italy, Spain, or UK. Using financial data, tax rate, and country corruption level, linear regression is carried out to determine the impact of corruption on income shifting process. Using anomie theory, this study offers additional evidence that corruption is a symptom of instability and influences managers' decision‐making processes. Managers tend to shift income towards less corrupted countries and so, high bribery reduces the incentive to attract foreign income. These results are novel given we focus on European international groups and not merely on single firms. They confirm the positive effects of responsible business and the attractiveness of countries that control for corruption.

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Private-to-private Corruption

Cited by 67 publications

References 12 publications

Understanding Corruption in Organizations – Development and Empirical Assessment of an Action Model

Understanding Corruption in Organizations – Development and Empirical Assessment of an Action Model

Corruption and Companies: The Use of Facilitating Payments

Corruption and sustainable development: The impact on income shifting in European international groups

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