Private operation with public supervision: evidence of hybrid modes of governance in prisons

Cabral, Sandro; Lazzarini, Sérgio G.; Azevedo, Paulo Furquim de

doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9566-0

Cited by 50 publications

(41 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…In a Swedish study, Lindqvist (2008) finds that private facilities have lower base line quality than public facilities, although public facilities are also found to shun particularly troublesome teenagers. For prisons, both Pozen (2003) in a review article and Cabral et al (2010) in a recent Brazilian study, conclude that quality is at least as high in private prisons.…”

Section: Costs and Qualitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Outsourcing Public Services: Ownership, Competition, Quality and Contracting

Андерссон

Jordahl

2011

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in A B S T R A C TWe survey the literature on the effects of public sector outsourcing. Guided by theory, we systematically arrange services according to the type and magnitude of their contractibility problems. Taken as a whole, the empirical literature indicates that public sector outsourcing generally reduces costs without hurting quality. This is clearly the case for "perfectly contractible services" like garbage collection, but outsourcing often seems to work reasonably well also for some services with more difficult contracting problems, e.g. fire protection and prisons. Outsourcing seems to be more problematic for credence goods, with residential youth care as the prime example. In contrast to previous reviews, we conclude that ownership and competition appear to be about equally important for the consequences of public sector outsourcing.JEL classification: D23, H11, L33

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Section: Costs and Qualitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Outsourcing Public Services: Ownership, Competition, Quality and Contracting

Андерссон

Jordahl

2011

SSRN Journal

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“…Also, if public-private partnerships involve profit-oriented firms, then their typical higherpowered incentives promote superior capabilities for efficient execution, leading to lower costs and higher productivity (Cabral et al, 2010(Cabral et al, , 2013Engel et al, 2014). …”

Section: Forms Of Collaboration and Their Effect On Initiatives For Smentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Received theory has conceived publicprivate hybrids as forms that mix elements of private markets and public bureaucracies; for instance, firms in traditional public-private partnerships are autonomous entities but are normally subject to strong public supervision (e.g. Cabral et al, 2010;Williamson, 1999). However, while a cursory examination of collaborations in the public sector suggests multiple types of hybrid forms, the literature has tended to examine each single hybrid in isolation.…”

Section: Contributionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hybrids of Hybrids? Plural Forms of Collaboration and the Social Value of Public Initiatives

et al. 2017

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This is the accepted version of the paper.This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. Permanent HYBRIDS OF HYBRIDS? PLURAL FORMS OF COLLABORATION AND THE SOCIAL VALUE OF PUBLIC INITIATIVES AbstractAlthough public initiatives often involve multiple collaborative (hybrid) arrangements between for-profit, nonprofit, and public actors, we still lack a consolidated framework explaining how a single public initiative can involve multiple types of collaboration in tandem. We examine three concurrent hybrids-public collaborations with for-profit firms, with non-profit organizations, and between units of the public bureaucracy-and use fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to unveil configurations consistent with social value creation (evidence of social impact) based on a unique set of 24 public initiatives in Brazil, India, and South Africa. We find configurations involving multiple or plural types of collaboration ("hybrids of hybrids") and inductively propose theoretical mechanisms explaining contingent synergistic effects of those hybrids as a function of their resource complementarity and perceived legitimacy.

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“…After numerous discussions, Brazil adopted a model where the government retains the ultimate responsibility for an inmate's custody, remaining in charge of the external security and the management of the facility (i.e., warden, vice-warden and security coordinator). Private actors run all other services including internal security, food, medical aid, legal assistance, dental care, leisure, education, facilities management, and provision of vehicles (Cabral, Lazzarini, & Azevedo, 2010). Although inspired by the French experience, the Brazilian example is placed somewhere between the U.S. and French experiences, as certain activities not delegated to private operators in France can be outsourced in Brazil, such as internal security and legal assistance to inmates.…”

Section: The Brazilian Experience: Between the French And Us Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In addition, an important characteristic of hybrid forms is the presence of civil servants inside the prison, as they are able to verify the quality of the services provided and occasionally enforce sanctions in the case of certain contractual non-conformities (see Cabral et al, 2010). The presence of public supervisors enables the separation of operation and management, which may foster the enforcement of sanctions in case of contractual non-compliance (Cabral & Azevedo, 2008).…”

Section: Decision Rightsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Organizing Prisons through Public-Private Partnerships: a cross-country investigation

Cabral

Saussier

2012

BAR, Braz. Adm. Rev.

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In this paper, we analyze the private participation in prison services in three countries: Brazil, France, and the United States. We highlight striking differences in efficiency between these countries and argue that the explanation for these differences is not restricted to the way property rights are distributed (i.e. public vs. private management). Instead, our analysis suggests that understanding those differences also requires an analysis of the incentives provided by contractual choices as well as decision and revenue rights distribution and institutional constraints. The theoretical literature usually analyzes these blocks separately, and often focuses on property rights distribution. We argue that an efficient arrangement is the result of the way these elements are combined, giving rise to a distinctive governance structure.

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Private operation with public supervision: evidence of hybrid modes of governance in prisons

Abstract: Hybrid governance, Public supervision, Prisons, Implicit contracts, L33,

Cited by 50 publications

References 26 publications

Outsourcing Public Services: Ownership, Competition, Quality and Contracting

Outsourcing Public Services: Ownership, Competition, Quality and Contracting

Hybrids of Hybrids? Plural Forms of Collaboration and the Social Value of Public Initiatives

Organizing Prisons through Public-Private Partnerships: a cross-country investigation

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