Prisoner's Dilemma

Rapoport, Anatol; Chammah, Albert M.

doi:10.3998/mpub.20269

Cited by 1,330 publications

(365 citation statements)

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“…In terms of 0 < r < 1, we have T = 1+r, R = 1, S = 1−r, and P = 0. For a player, the best action is: to take D if the opponent takes C, otherwise take C. A larger value of r tends to encourage the action D. The SG becomes the PD when the cost c is high such that 2b > c > b > 0, which amounts to the ranking T > R > P > S [23,24]. Therefore, the SG and PD game differ only by the ordering of P and S. Due to the difficulty in measuring payoffs in game theory, the SD has been proposed to be a possible alternative to the PD game in studying emerging cooperative phenomena [6,19].…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Networking effects on cooperation in evolutionary snowdrift game

Liu

Zheng

et al. 2006

Europhys. Lett.

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The effects of networking on the extent of cooperation emerging in a competitive setting are studied. The evolutionary snowdrift game, which represents a realistic alternative to the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma, is studied in the Watts-Strogatz network that spans the regular, small-world, and random networks through random re-wiring. Over a wide range of payoffs, a re-wired network is found to suppress cooperation when compared with a well-mixed or fully connected system. Two extinction payoffs, that characterize the emergence of a homogeneous steady state, are identified. It is found that, unlike in the Prisoner's Dilemma, the standard deviation of the degree distribution is the dominant property in a re-wired network that governs the extinction payoffs.

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Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Networking effects on cooperation in evolutionary snowdrift game

Liu

Zheng

et al. 2006

Europhys. Lett.

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“…This conundrum is because many of our interactions can be framed as Prisoner's Dilemmas (3)(4)(5) or Public Goods Games (6), famous for bringing about a tragedy of the commons (7). Several mechanisms have been suggested as putative explanations of cooperative behavior (8), among which the existence of an underlying network of contacts constraining who one can interact with has received very much attention.…”

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confidence: 99%

Heterogeneous networks do not promote cooperation when humans play a Prisoner’s Dilemma

Gracia-Lázaro

Ferrer

Ruiz

et al. 2012

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

310

339

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It is not fully understood why we cooperate with strangers on a daily basis. In an increasingly global world, where interaction networks and relationships between individuals are becoming more complex, different hypotheses have been put forward to explain the foundations of human cooperation on a large scale and to account for the true motivations that are behind this phenomenon. In this context, population structure has been suggested to foster cooperation in social dilemmas, but theoretical studies of this mechanism have yielded contradictory results so far; additionally, the issue lacks a proper experimental test in large systems. We have performed the largest experiments to date with humans playing a spatial Prisoner's Dilemma on a lattice and a scale-free network (1,229 subjects). We observed that the level of cooperation reached in both networks is the same, comparable with the level of cooperation of smaller networks or unstructured populations. We have also found that subjects respond to the cooperation that they observe in a reciprocal manner, being more likely to cooperate if, in the previous round, many of their neighbors and themselves did so, which implies that humans do not consider neighbors' payoffs when making their decisions in this dilemma but only their actions. Our results, which are in agreement with recent theoretical predictions based on this behavioral rule, suggest that population structure has little relevance as a cooperation promoter or inhibitor among humans.evolutionary game dynamics | network reciprocity | conditional cooperation

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“…La théorie des jeux et le célèbre dilemme du prisonnier (Rappoport et Chammah, 1965) montrent que des acteurs concurrents préfèreront l'affrontement plutôt que la coopération à cause du risque d'opportunisme d'un des acteurs. L'introduction d'un intermédiaire dans le processus de décision pourrait favoriser la confiance entre les deux acteurs et ainsi réduire ce risque d'opportunisme si celui-ci joue le rôle de garant de la coopération.…”

Section: Proposition 1 : Il Existe Une Forme D'intermédiation En Situunclassified

Comprendre le rôle de l’intermédiation dans la coopétition : le cas des industries aéronautiques et spatiales

Salvetat

Géraudel²

2011

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Comment créer ou favoriser la coopération entre entreprises concurrentes compte tenu des risques d’opportunisme inhérents à la coopétition ? Le rôle de l’acteur intermédiaire occupe une place prépondérante dans la réponse à cette question. Peu de recherches s’intéressent à celui-ci sous l’angle des relations coopétitives. Le but de cette recherche est donc de comprendre les mécanismes sous-jacents existants entre les acteurs intermédiaires et les entreprises impliquées dans une relation de coopétition. 58 entretiens semi-directifs ont été menés dans les organisations du secteur aéronautique et spatial.

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Prisoner's Dilemma

Cited by 1,330 publications

References 0 publications

Networking effects on cooperation in evolutionary snowdrift game

Networking effects on cooperation in evolutionary snowdrift game

Heterogeneous networks do not promote cooperation when humans play a Prisoner’s Dilemma

Comprendre le rôle de l’intermédiation dans la coopétition : le cas des industries aéronautiques et spatiales

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