2016
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2015.2177
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Principal–Agent Settings with Random Shocks

Abstract: Using a gift exchange experiment, we show that the ability of reciprocity to overcome incentive problems inherent in principal-agent settings is greatly reduced when the agent's effort is distorted by random shocks and transmitted imperfectly to the principal. Specifically, we find that gift exchange contracts without shocks encourage effort and wages well above standard predictions. However, the introduction of random shocks reduces wages and effort, regardless of whether the shocks can be observed by the pri… Show more

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Cited by 54 publications
(33 citation statements)
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“…The random component can be thought of as random error, imperfect information about performance (Holmström, 1979), or production luck (Rubin and Sheremeta, 2015). It can also be interpreted as an unknown ability (Rosen, 1986).…”
Section: The Theoretical Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The random component can be thought of as random error, imperfect information about performance (Holmström, 1979), or production luck (Rubin and Sheremeta, 2015). It can also be interpreted as an unknown ability (Rosen, 1986).…”
Section: The Theoretical Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the experiments by Fehr et al (1997Fehr et al ( , 2007, the worker's effort is perfectly observable by the firm. In a recent experiment, Rubin and Sheremeta (2016)-RS16 in the following-distort the worker's effort choice in the bonus-version of the giftexchange game by a random, zero-mean shock.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…9 Participants were also told that they could stop counting characters 6 Two coauthors of this paper ran the initial sessions together to agree on the same experimental procedures and then followed it independently for the rest of the experiments. 7 While most papers in the literature do not have this property, there are some studies in which income is determined by both performance and luck (i.e., Cappelen et al, 2007;Erkal et al, 2011;Rubin and Sheremeta, 2016). 8 There were 300 sequences, which is more than anyone could finish within the allocated time.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%