Most of us need the services of an expert when our apartment's heating or our washing machine breaks down, or when our car starts to make strange noises. And for most of us, commissioning an expert to solve the problem causes concern. This concern does not disappear even after repair and payment of the bill. On the contrary, one worries about paying for a service that was not provided or receiving some unnecessary treatment. This article studies the economics underlying these worries. Under which conditions do experts have an incentive to exploit the informational problems associated with markets for diagnosis and treatment? What types of fraud exist? What are the methods and institutions for dealing with these informational problems? Under which conditions does the market provide incentives to deter fraudulent behavior? And what happens if all or some of those conditions are violated?
Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market breakdown. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that liability or verifiability yield efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability at best a minor, effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation has little influence, as predicted. Seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade, but does not lead to higher efficiency as long as liability is violated. (JEL D12, D82)
Credence goods are characterized by informational asymmetries between sellers and consumers that invite fraudulent behavior by sellers. This paper presents the results of a natural field experiment on taxi rides in Athens, Greece, set up to measure different types of fraud and to examine the influence of passengers' presumed information and income on the extent of fraud. Results reveal that taxi drivers cheat passengers in systematic ways: Passengers with inferior information about optimal routes are taken on longer detours while asymmetric information on the local tariff system leads to manipulated bills. Higher income seems to lead to more fraud. JEL-Code: C930, D820.
Highlights► We study the relationship between distributional preferences and competitive behavior in the lab. ► We distinguish between efficiency-minded, inequality averse, and spiteful types. ► Spiteful types perform better than the other two types in a competitive environment. ► Efficiency-minded subjects are more likely to self-select into a competitive environment. ► Distributional and risk preferences largely explain the gender gap in the willingness to compete.
This paper proposes a geometric delineation of distributional preference types and a non-parametric approach for their identification in a two-person context. It starts with a small set of assumptions on preferences and shows that this set (i) naturally results in a taxonomy of distributional archetypes that nests all empirically relevant types considered in previous work; and (ii) gives rise to a clean experimental identification procedure – the Equality Equivalence Test – that discriminates between archetypes according to core features of preferences rather than properties of specific modeling variants. As a by-product the test yields a two-dimensional index of preference intensity.
a b s t r a c tThis paper studies the incentives for credence goods experts to invest effort in diagnosis if effort is both costly and unobservable, and if they face competition by discounters who are not able to perform a diagnosis. The unobservability of diagnosis effort and the credence characteristic of the good induce experts to choose incentive compatible tariff structures. This makes them vulnerable to competition by discounters. We explore the conditions under which honestly diagnosing experts survive competition by discounters; we identify situations in which experts misdiagnose consumers in order to prevent them from free-riding on experts' advice; and we discuss policy options to solve the free-riding consumers-cheating experts problem.
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