Prime Ministerial Popularity and the Changing Electoral Fortunes of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party

Patterson, Dennis; Maeda, Ko

doi:10.1525/as.2007.47.3.415

Cited by 6 publications

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“…13. The prime minister's popularity also affects elections, perhaps through perceptions of the LDP (Patterson and Maeda, 2007). 14.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic accountability and strategic calibration

Burden

2013

Party Politics

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I argue that the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan employed a strategy to prevent unpopular prime ministers from tainting the party’s image. Time-series analyses of public opinion data from 1960 to 2006 show that national economic performance had modest effects on prime minister support ratings and no effects on LDP ratings. When prime minister ratings fall below party ratings, cabinets are more likely to be reshuffled and prime ministers to be replaced to avoid having the cabinet’s negative image ‘rub off’ on the LDP. Although electoral rules, culture, and other factors surely play a role in sustaining the LDP, I show for the first time that the party manages its cabinet personnel strategically to maintain support.

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“…13. The prime minister's popularity also affects elections, perhaps through perceptions of the LDP (Patterson and Maeda, 2007). 14.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic accountability and strategic calibration

Burden

2013

Party Politics

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“…The literature on the recent elections in Japan suggests that party labels and the leadership's popularity now signiicantly inluence candidates' electoral fortunes (McElwain 2012;Patterson and Maeda 2007) and clientelism is now being replaced by programmatism (Rosenbluth and Thies 2010). Furthermore, in 2009 Japan had a government turnover through elections for the irst time in more than 60 years, because the combination of the DPJ's potential and disillusionment with the LDP government's policy performance convinced most swing voters: a poll on the 2009 turnover, for example, showed that 61.2% of voters thought party reputations were important in making voting decisions, compared to 29.0% who considered individual candidates' personal traits as important (Akarui Senkyo Suishin Kyōkai 2010).…”

Section: Kuniaki Nemoto and Chia-hung Tsaimentioning

confidence: 99%

Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context

Batto¹,

Huang²,

Tan³

et al. 2016

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Reformers have promoted mixed-member electoral systems as the "best of both worlds." In this volume, internationally recognized political scientists evaluate the ways in which the introduction of a mixed-member electoral system affects the coniguration of political parties. The contributors examine several political phenomena, including cabinet post allocation, nominations, preelectoral coalitions, split-ticket voting, and the size of party systems and faction systems. Signiicantly, they also consider various ways in which the constitutional system-especially whether the head of government is elected directly or indirectly-can modify the incentives created by the electoral system. Part I of the book provides an in-depth comparison of Taiwan and Japan, both of which moved from single nontransferable vote systems to mixed-member majoritarian systems. These cases demonstrate that the higher the payoffs of attaining the executive ofice and the greater degree of cross-district coordination required to win it, the stronger the incentives for elites to form and stay in the major parties. In such a context, a country will move rapidly toward a two-party system. In Part II, the contributors apply this theoretical logic to other countries with mixed-member systems and ind that executive competition has the same effect on legislative electoral rules in countries as disparate as Thailand, the Philippines, New Zealand, Bolivia, and Russia.The indings presented here demonstrate that the success of electoral reform depends not only on the speciication of new electoral rules per se but also on the political context-and especially the constitutional framework-within which such rules are embedded. AcknowledgmentsThe genesis of this volume lies in an attempt to answer a basic research question that surfaced in a roundtable of the second annual Asian Election Studies Conference held at the Election Study Center (ESC) of the National Chengchi University (NCCU), Taiwan, in May 2010. Why was it that Taiwan and Japan, two similar East Asian countries that had both switched from similar single nontransferable vote to similar mixed-member majoritarian legislative electoral systems, had displayed such divergent speeds and degrees in moving toward the theoretically expected consolidation of their party systems? A brainstorm with Gary Cox during his visit to the ESC in November 2011 sparked the idea of taking into account the constitutional context in which the electoral systems operate.As with any book-length project, we have a number of people and institutions to thank. We thank the ESC and its director, Lu-huei Chen, for continuous administrative support throughout the life of the project. A book with twenty-one coauthors based in ifteen institutions spanning four countries needs some sort of institutional base, and the ESC provided that home. We also wish to acknowledge our four home institutions, the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica, National Chengchi University, the University of Canterbury, and Stanford University. ...

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“…A theory of electoral systems predicts that the move from SNTV to MMM should produce a trend away from personal politics and toward party-centered politics. The literature on the recent elections in Japan suggests that party labels and the leadership's popularity now signiicantly inluence candidates' electoral fortunes (McElwain 2012;Patterson and Maeda 2007) and clientelism is now being replaced by programmatism (Rosenbluth and Thies 2010). Furthermore, in 2009 Japan had a government turnover through elections for the irst time in more than 60 years, because the combination of the DPJ's potential and disillusionment with the LDP government's policy performance convinced most swing voters: a poll on the 2009 turnover, for example, showed that 61.2% of voters thought party reputations were important in making voting decisions, compared to 29.0% who considered individual candidates' personal traits as important (Akarui Senkyo Suishin Kyōkai 2010).…”

Section: Kuniaki Nemoto and Chia-hung Tsaimentioning

confidence: 99%

Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context

Batto¹,

Huang²,

Tan³

et al. 2016

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

leonard wantchekon, princeton University the new comparative politics series brings together cutting-edge work on social conlict, political economy, and institutional development. whatever its substantive focus, each book in the series builds on solid theoretical foundations; uses rigorous empirical analysis; and deals with timely, politically relevant questions. Curbing Bailouts: Bank Crises and Democratic Accountability in Comparative PerspectiveGuillermo rosasThe Madisonian Turn: Political Parties and Parliamentary Democracy in Nordic Europe edited by torbjörn Bergman and Kaare strøm Political Survival of Small Parties in Europe Jae-Jae spoon Veto Power: Institutional Design in the European Union Jonathan B. slapin Democracy, Dictatorship, and Term Limits alexander Baturo Democracy, Electoral Systems, and Judicial Empowerment in Developing Countries vineeta Yadav and Bumba mukherjee The Latin American Voter: Pursuing Representation and Accountability in Challenging Contexts edited by ryan e. carlin, matthew m. singer, and elizabeth J. Zechmeister The European Union and the Rise of Regionalist Parties seth K. Jolly Gender Quotas and Democratic Participation: Recruiting Candidates for Elective Ofices in Germany louise K. Davidson-schmich Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context: Taiwan, Japan, and Beyond edited by nathan F. Batto, chi Huang, alexander c. tan, and Gary w. cox

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Prime Ministerial Popularity and the Changing Electoral Fortunes of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party

Cited by 6 publications

References 6 publications

Economic accountability and strategic calibration

Economic accountability and strategic calibration

Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context

Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context

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