Economic accountability and strategic calibration

Abstract

I argue that the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan employed a strategy to prevent unpopular prime ministers from tainting the party’s image. Time-series analyses of public opinion data from 1960 to 2006 show that national economic performance had modest effects on prime minister support ratings and no effects on LDP ratings. When prime minister ratings fall below party ratings, cabinets are more likely to be reshuffled and prime ministers to be replaced to avoid having the cabinet’s negative image ‘rub off’ on the LDP. Although electoral rules, culture, and other factors surely play a role in sustaining the LDP, I show for the first time that the party manages its cabinet personnel strategically to maintain support.

Portfolio Allocation as Leadership Strategy: Intraparty Bargaining in Japan

“…The party leader plays a significant role in maintaining the party's brand name and attempts to impress the electorate in order to win the trust of voters (see Bean and Mughan 1989; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993). Indeed, the opinion poll data on the LDP indicate the party leader's reputation boosts the party's popularity, but not the other way around (Burden 2005). Hence, a popular party leader can prevent his rivals from usurping his power, and a party leader should be less likely to face challenges from internal rivals when he is a popular figure among the broader public.…”

“…The possibility of removal rises when an unpopular leader devalues the party's brand name. That is, the party leader faces challenges from internal rivals when his approval rating falls below the party's approval rating (see Burden 2005). 22 Thus, I take the difference between the party leader's approval rating and the party's approval rating to measure the extent to which the party leader is popular relative to the party 23…”

Indirect Executive Accountability of Prime Ministers

“…Remarkably short durations, such as those observed in Japan and Italy in certain periods (or those observed very recently in the United Kingdom), can largely be explained by the non-electoral replacement of the PM as a result of intra-party politics (cf. Burden, 2015). This emphasizes the theoretical and empirical importance of analyzing intra-party politics.…”