Primate cognition: attention, episodic memory, prospective memory, self‐control, and metacognition as examples of cognitive control in nonhuman primates

Abstract

Primate Cognition is the study of cognitive processes, which represent internal mental processes involved in discriminations, decisions, and behaviors of humans and other primate species. Cognitive control involves executive and regulatory processes that allocate attention, manipulate and evaluate available information (and, when necessary, seek additional information), remember past experiences to plan future behaviors, and deal with distraction and impulsivity when they are threats to goal achievement. Areas of research that relate to cognitive control as it is assessed across species include executive attention, episodic memory, prospective memory, metacognition and self-control. Executive attention refers to the ability to control what sensory stimuli one attends to and how one regulates responses to those stimuli, especially in cases of conflict. Episodic memory refers to memory for personally experienced, autobiographical events. Prospective memory refers to the formation and implementation of future-intended actions, such as remembering what needs to be done later. Metacognition consists of control and monitoring processes that allow individuals to assess what information they have and what information they still need, and then if necessary to seek information. Self-control is a regulatory process whereby individuals forego more immediate or easier to obtain rewards for more delayed or harder to obtain rewards that are objectively more valuable. The behavioral complexity shown by nonhuman primates when given tests to assess these capacities indicates psychological continuities with human cognitive control capacities. However, more research is needed to clarify the proper interpretation of these behaviors with regard to possible cognitive constructs that may underlie such behaviors.

How does the non-conscious become conscious?

“…In light of this, it is notable that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex not only receives visual and other sensory inputs, but also inputs from circuits that form and store long-term memories ( Figure 1) [3,11], including both semantic and episodic memories [12][13][14]. Semantic memory is about facts, such as the features and uses of objects.…”

“…For the most part, however, we experience and remember our lives as complex episodes rather than encounters with isolated stimuli. Episodes include facts and concepts, but in the context of personal experiences [12,13,16,17]. They are marked by what happened to you, and where and when it happened [16].…”

“…Working memory uses executive control functions, like attention, to select, monitor, temporarily maintain, and integrate diverse kinds of information from specialized processors. The specialized processors, which involve circuits underlying sensory, memory, verbal, and other functions, are mostly located in posterior cortical areas, each of which is reciprocally connected with prefrontal areas [3,[11][12][13][14]. Executive functions, on the other hand, are mostly associated with prefrontal cortex itself [21] (but with parietal cortex also contributing).…”

Rats know when they remember: transfer of metacognitive responding across odor-based delayed match-to-sample tests

“…Evidence for metacognition in other species like pigeons (Castro & Wasserman, 2013; Inman & Shettleworth, 1999; Iwasaki et al, 2013; Roberts et al, 2009; Roberts et al, 2012; Sutton & Shettleworth, 2008), New World monkeys (Basile et al, 2008; Beran et al, 2016; Paukner et al, 2006; Vining & Marsh, 2015) and rats (Foote & Crystal, 2007; Foote & Crystal, 2012) has been less robust, making it unclear whether metamemory is phylogenetically limited to Old World monkeys and apes, or whether is it a more ancient cognitive ability. Demonstrations of some aspects of metacognitive behavior in pigeons (Adams & Santi, 2011; Zentall and Stagner, 2010) and capuchin monkeys (Beran, Perdue, Church, & Smith, 2016) have been more convincing, but certainly not as substantial as those in macaque monkeys (Beran et al, 2016).…”

“…Demonstrations of some aspects of metacognitive behavior in pigeons (Adams & Santi, 2011; Zentall and Stagner, 2010) and capuchin monkeys (Beran, Perdue, Church, & Smith, 2016) have been more convincing, but certainly not as substantial as those in macaque monkeys (Beran et al, 2016). In the few studies that exist, evidence for metacognition in rats is also mixed (Foote & Crystal, 2017; 2012; Kirk et al, 2014; Yuki & Okanoya, 2017).…”