Pricing policies for complementary products in a dual-channel supply chain

Zhao, Jing; Hou, Xiaorui; Guo, Y. Q.; Wei, J.

doi:10.1016/j.apm.2017.04.023

Cited by 84 publications

(43 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…Excessive price adjustment is often detrimental to their own interests but will make the other side to get more profits. Many scholars (e.g., [22][23][24][25]) have studied the price strategies for different channel structures and different product strategies.…”

Section: Pricing Strategy Researches In Dual-channel Supply Chainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing Strategies in Dual‐Channel Supply Chain with a Fair Caring Retailer

et al. 2019

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Manufacturers add online direct channels that inevitably engage in channel competition with offline retail channels. Since price is an important factor in consumers' choice of purchasing channel, pricing strategy has become a popular topic for research on dual-channel competition and coordination. In contrast to previous research on pricing strategies based on the full rationality of members, we focus on the impact of retailers' fairness concerns on pricing strategies. In this study, the hybrid dual-channel supply chain consists of one manufacturer with a direct channel who acts as the leader and a retailer who acts as the follower. First, we use the Stackelberg game approach to determine the equilibrium pricing strategy for a fair caring retailer. Simultaneously, we consider a centralized dual-channel supply chain as the benchmark for a comparative analysis of the efficiency of a decentralized supply chain. Furthermore, we study pricing strategies when the retailer has fairness concerns and determine the complete equilibrium solutions for different ranges of the parameters representing cross-price sensitivity and fairness. Finally, through numerical experiments, the pricing strategies, the profit and utility of the manufacturer and retailer, and the channel efficiency of the supply chain are compared and analysed for two scenarios. We find that fairness concerns reduce the manufacturer's profits, while for the most part, the retailers’ profit can be improved; however, the supply chain cannot achieve complete coordination.

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Section: Pricing Strategy Researches In Dual-channel Supply Chainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing Strategies in Dual‐Channel Supply Chain with a Fair Caring Retailer

et al. 2019

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“…Zhao et al [15] examine the pricing decisions of a monopoly common retailer channel structure under eight pricing game models, their observation shows that the leadership between two manufacturers and a common retailer does not affect the profit of the entire supply chain under Bertrand competition or cooperation strategy. Zhao et al [16] extend this research by examining the pricing decisions of a similar channel structure under different price leadership scenarios. e third chain structure is a monopoly common manufacturer channel; Yang et al [7] consider the pricing and quantity decisions of a monopoly manufacturer channel model under MS game, the total profit of the duopolistic retailers who act as the followers could gain more benefits than the manufacturer's as long as the degree of dissimilarity between the duopolistic retailers' market demands is large enough.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 88%

Game Theoretical Perspectives on Pricing Decisions in Asymmetric Competing Supply Chains

Tan

Liu

2020

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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This paper investigates a dual exclusive channel model in which each manufacturer distributes its goods through a single exclusive retailer, but two goods are substitute. The decision rule between two channels is Nash game in Case 1, while it is Stackelberg game in Case 2. From manufacturer Stackelberg (MS), retailer Stackelberg (RS), and Nash game (VN) theoretic perspectives, nine game models are developed to examine the effect of product substitutability and relative channel status on pricing decisions at both horizontal competition and vertical competition levels. The analysis suggests that the type of price leadership scenarios, the level of product substitutability, and the relative channel status play a significant role in decision making. For instance, in case 1, the symmetric leadership (two manufacturers or two retailers are leaders) is always the dominant strategy and equilibrium for either two manufacturers or two retailers regardless of product substitutability and relative channel status. Nevertheless, the asymmetric leadership may lead channel members to encounter a prisoner’s dilemma if the relative channel status is small. By contrast, in Case 2, the symmetric leadership is not the unique dominant strategy for either two manufacturers or two retailers. In contrast to many earlier results, we also show that whether the first-mover and the late-mover advantages exist, depending on the level of related channel status.

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“…Zhao et al. () analyze pricing strategies for complementary products in the dual‐channel supply chain.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing strategies for dual‐channel supply chains under a trade credit policy

Qin

Ren

Lei

et al. 2019

Int Trans Operational Res

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This paper discusses the impact of a trade credit policy on alleviating conflicts arising on a dual-channel supply chain that includes one manufacturer and one value-added retailer. We use the Stackelberg game to model the problem and characterize optimal pricing strategies for each supply chain partner, examining different circumstances in terms of retail price and trade credit contracts. When a consistent price strategy is applied in the dual channels under conditions of an exogenous credit period, trade credit can help both partners to achieve win-win situations in the following circumstances: (1) when the retail channel's market share is small and the retailer's interest rate is high; or (2) when the retail channel's market share is large and the retailer's interest rate is lower than the manufacturer's. The study also concludes that when an inconsistent price strategy is applied, a trade credit contract can alleviate channel conflicts when the retailer's interest rate is higher than the manufacturer's. Otherwise, the partners may terminate cooperation. However, when the manufacturer has the power to determine and set the credit period, trade credit cannot alleviate channel conflicts under consistent price and inconsistent price scenarios.

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Pricing policies for complementary products in a dual-channel supply chain

Cited by 84 publications

References 32 publications

Pricing Strategies in Dual‐Channel Supply Chain with a Fair Caring Retailer

Pricing Strategies in Dual‐Channel Supply Chain with a Fair Caring Retailer

Game Theoretical Perspectives on Pricing Decisions in Asymmetric Competing Supply Chains

Pricing strategies for dual‐channel supply chains under a trade credit policy

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