Pricing and Rate Optimization of Cloud Radio Access Network Using Robust Hierarchical Dynamic Game

Modeling the Techno-Economic Interactions of Infrastructure and Service Providers in 5G Networks With a Multi-Leader-Follower Game

“…Instead, if the InPs are very similar, it might be difficult to find an equilibrium, unless the spectrum bandwidth is very low or very high. Concerning the equilibria multiplicity, which results 23 from the equilibria multiplicity of the InPs' game at stage 1 and/or of the SPs' game stage 2, the multiple equilibria are always equivalent for all players (i.e., for all InPs and all SPs) since each player obtains the same payoff in all of them, hence they represent the same sys- 23 Let n K denote the number of NE in pure strategies of G K where n K ≥ 1, and letP i denote the unit price profile of the i-th NE of G K where 1 ≤ i ≤ n K . Then let n V i denote the number of NE in pure strategies of…”

“…Stackelberg games are widely used in the literature to model the interaction among multiple self-interested entities in the field of resource management problems in 5G networks [16]; specific application arena include Heterogenous Networks (HetNets) [17], [18], edge caching [19], edge computing [20], device-to-device communications [21], cognitive networks [22], Cloud Radio Access Networks (C-RANs) [23].…”

Leader–Follower Network Aggregative Game With Stochastic Agents’ Communication and Activeness

“…where the last term of (26) is rearranged, since the leader only makes decision at k L j ∈ K L and therefore, the term ||∇y k L j || 2 is the same from iteration k L j−1 to k L j . By putting (25) and (26) into (20), it can be concluded that…”

“…Considering Assumption 2, it's clear that E{e k n F k } = q k n ≥ δ. Therefore, applying inequalities ( 23) and ( 24) into the last two terms of (20), it can be concluded that…”

“…However, in many applications, there is a high-level agent (leader) who aims to optimize its own objective function which also depends on the strategies of other agents at a lower level (followers). Several researches have investigated leader-follower games [17]- [19] and it has been extensively utilized in many engineering fields such as wireless sensor networks [20], supply chain management [21], and smart grid [22]. If the leader has complete information about the followers' cost functions, then the concept of Stackelberg equilibrium can be applied directly [18].…”