Pricing and collecting decisions in a closed-loop supply chain with symmetric and asymmetric information

Wei, J.; Govindan, Kannan; Li, Yongjian; Zhao, Jing

doi:10.1016/j.cor.2013.11.021

Cited by 144 publications

(65 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…(3) It is assumed that collected WEEE materials and components take precedence over the new components in production [6,18,25]. (4) In this model, we assume that all CLSC members are risk-neutral, without regard to risk preference or risk aversion.…”

Section: Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Giovanni [17] designed two incentive games by a profit-sharing contract to find out how the sharing information should be determined to benefit all the players. Wei et al [18] investigated optimal strategies in different game scenarios under symmetric and asymmetric information structures. They found that the manufacturer's asymmetric information on manufacturing and remanufacturing costs may increase the retail price, while the Sustainability 2018, 10, 2131 3 of 31 private information of the retailer on the collection quantity and the size of the recycling market may increase the wholesale price.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Competitive Dual Collection Channel under Asymmetric Information and Reward–Penalty Mechanism

et al. 2018

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Abstract:We investigate a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) where the retailer and the third-party recycler compete against each other to collect waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) given that collection effort is their private information. Using the principle-agent theory, we develop a CLSC model with dual collection channel without the government's reward-penalty mechanism (RPM). An information screening contract is designed for the manufacturer to attain real information on collection effort levels; meanwhile, the optimal decision-making results of other decision variables are derived. Next, we take RPM into account to further examine the efficacy of the government's guidance mechanism in improving collection rate and profits of CLSC members. Our results indicate that (i) the collection competition reduces the total collection quantity and the expected profits of all the CLSC members without RPM; (ii) all CLSC members' expected profits are improved if both two collection agents select a high collection effort level without and with RPM; (iii) RPM increases buyback price, collection price, collection quantity, and franchise fee but decreases wholesale price and retail price; with the reward-penalty intensity increasing, the manufacturer's expected profit first decreases and then increases, while the expected profits of H-type retailer and H-type third-party recycler continue to increase. We find that RPM may ultimately stimulate the collection agents to collect more WEEEs, while the intense collection competition reduces the profits of CLSC members.

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Section: Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Competitive Dual Collection Channel under Asymmetric Information and Reward–Penalty Mechanism

et al. 2018

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“…Note that the sales prices can be decided (p i = w i + r i , i = 1, 2) when the corresponding wholesale prices and retailer markup policies are determined. Consistent with the extant literatures [6,[17][18][19]42], we suppose that each retailer faces the following linear demand function:…”

Section: Notations and Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing Decision in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain with Competing Retailers Under Uncertain Environment

et al. 2017

J. Uncertain. Anal. Appl.

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This paper explores a supply chain pricing competition problem in a two-echelon supply chain with one manufacturer and two competing retailers. The manufacturing costs, sales costs, and market bases are all characterized as uncertain variables whose distributions are estimated by experts' experienced data. In consideration of channel members' different market powers, three decentralized game models are employed to explore the equilibrium behaviors in corresponding decision circumstances. How the channel members should choose their most profitable pricing strategies in face of uncertainties is derived from these models. Numerical experiments are conducted to examine the effects of power structures and parameters' uncertain degrees on the pricing decisions of the members. The results show that the existence of dominant powers in the supply chain will increase the sales prices and reduce the profit of the whole supply chain. It is also found that the supply chain members may benefit from higher uncertain degrees of their own costs while the other supply chain members will gain less profits. Additionally, the results demonstrate that the uncertainty of the supply chain will make end consumers pay more. Some other interesting managerial highlights are also obtained in this paper.

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“…Huang et al studied the optimal decision-making of CLSC under double recycling channels and pointed out the dominant conditions of double recycling channels and single recycling channel [35]. Based on information symmetry or not, Wei et al constructed four types of CLSC decision-making models under the channel leadership dominated by manufacturers and retailers, respectively, and pointed out the optimal strategy in different situations [36]. Furthermore, the CLSC decision-making model with advertising effect in three different recycling modes was constructed by Hong et al [23].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dual Chains Competition under Two Recycling Modes Based on System Dynamics Method

et al. 2018

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Abstract:The fast-growing accumulation of electronic waste (e-waste) around the world is resulting in environmental pollution and adverse human health and, thus, has become a global area of concern. As the world's second largest producer of e-waste, China suffers significant pollution from e-waste because of inefficient recycling and management. This paper is a comparative systems dynamics study of two big home appliance manufacturers in China: Haier (Haier Group of Qingdao, China) and Gree (Gree Electric Appliances Inc. of Zhuhai, China). We used systems dynamics modeling to examine and compare the impact of closed-loop supply chain recycling and remanufacturing strategies on the total revenue of the supply chain and market shares of both manufacturers. Results show that an increase in third party service coverage and increased environmental awareness enhanced the total revenue of supply chain. Retailers showed more enthusiasm for recycling through contract development with manufacturers, thus resulting in reduced time of payment in closed-loop supply chains. We also found that an improvement of the recycling mechanism of retailers results in an increase in the share of the supply chain market. Hence, we propose a better supply chain mode.

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Pricing and collecting decisions in a closed-loop supply chain with symmetric and asymmetric information

Cited by 144 publications

References 25 publications

A Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Competitive Dual Collection Channel under Asymmetric Information and Reward–Penalty Mechanism

A Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Competitive Dual Collection Channel under Asymmetric Information and Reward–Penalty Mechanism

Pricing Decision in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain with Competing Retailers Under Uncertain Environment

Dual Chains Competition under Two Recycling Modes Based on System Dynamics Method

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