Dual Chains Competition under Two Recycling Modes Based on System Dynamics Method

Xue, Renzheng; Zhang, Fengbin; Tian, Feng; Oloruntoba, Richard; Miao, Shidi

doi:10.3390/su10072382

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 34 publications

(47 reference statements)

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“…It was found that manufacturer recycling is optimal when recycling costs exhibit diseconomies of scale, and that retailer recycling outperforms manufacturer and third-party recycling when recycling costs exhibit economies of scale. Xue et al [27], aiming at the inefficiency of recycling and management of electronics in China, examined and compared the impact of closed-loop supply chain recycling and remanufacturing strategies on total supply chain revenue and the market share of two manufacturers, combined with the implementation of the Gree and Haier renewable energy projects. It was found that optimizing the incentive strategy between the manufacturer and retailers can effectively improve retailers' motivation to recycle.…”

Section: Selection Of Recycling Model For Waste Productsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Recycling Model Selection for Electronic Products Considering Platform Power and Blockchain Empowerment

Wang

2022

Sustainability

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This paper considers a dynamic platform-based, closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and an online platform. As an online distributor of the manufacturer, the platform expands the market scale by exerting the platform power. At the same time, to solve the problem of inconsistency between the actual recycling amount and the theoretical recycling amount in the recycling process of waste electronic products, the whole-process supervision of waste products is carried out with the help of blockchain technology, which is difficult to tamper with and is traceable. With the help of differential game theory, four differential game models of manufacturer recycling and platform recycling with and without blockchain are established. The state feedback strategies are derived from Bellman’s continuous dynamic programming theory. Through analytical results and comparative analysis, the adoption conditions of blockchain and the impact of blockchain on the selection of recycling models are obtained. The results illustrated that the introduction of blockchain technology effectively improves the real recycling rate of waste electronics, building trust in consumers, which benefits corporations in certain conditions. However, it amplifies the double marginal effect of the CLSC. Nevertheless, the implementation of blockchain is still beneficial to consumers, as the adverse impact of the double marginal effect is compensated by the improvement in consumer surplus. In addition, the study shows that the implementation of the blockchain incentivizes members, who benefit on the same recycling model when the fixed cost of the blockchain and the share ratio of the residual value of waste electronics are between certain thresholds. That is, both the manufacturer and the platform are better off in a manufacturer recycling model enabled by blockchain. Moreover, in this model, the social welfare and the recycling rate of waste electronics are increased, which enable the CLSC to achieve benefits related to economy, environment, and society.

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Section: Selection Of Recycling Model For Waste Productsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Recycling Model Selection for Electronic Products Considering Platform Power and Blockchain Empowerment

Wang

2022

Sustainability

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“…Battery manufacturing information plays a vital role inbattery material type judgment, performance evaluation, and life prediction, while coding encryption is complicated for recycling enterprises to obtain battery manufacturing information [47]. The material type judgment, performance evaluation and life prediction of battery are the problems that should be solved by fast and low-cost technology to ensure the development of the echelon utilization industry [48].By sharing battery information and developing echelon utilization technology, the low-end situation of waste batteries priced by valuable metal element content and weight, endow waste batteries with more possible value by echelon utilization and increase the profits of battery recycling [49], and enable all participants in the battery recycling industry chain to transport dangerous goods in accordance with the regulations in the process of waste battery logistics.…”

Section: ) Unknown Battery Qualitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Big-Data-Based Power Battery Recycling for New Energy Vehicles: Information Sharing Platform and Intelligent Transportation Optimization

Dai

Tian

et al. 2020

IEEE Access

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This paper focuses on the principal problems in the actual transaction of decommissioned power batteries such as the asymmetry of information, huge risk and difficult issues such as recovery and trace. And constructed a new energy vehicle decommissioned power battery recycling platform based on the big data technology. Integrated characteristics of big data information, this paper analyzes the operating mechanism of the Big-Data-Based power battery recovery platform. The functional module on this platform is designed and investigated for the functional requirements of users and shared information based on big data. Based on the analysis of traffic big data, a traction battery dangerous goods transportation optimization system is established by using Baidu map application program interface (API). The improved ant algorithm was used to obtain the shortest path model and decrease the transportation costs and risks, besides, it boosts the value of information resources maximum and gives impetus to the power battery recycling industrial transformation and upgrading.

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“…With the increasing awareness of sustainable development, recycling and reusing have become an important social concern [1,2]. In recent years, huge quantities of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) have been generated worldwide.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(1) What is the level of competition between the formal and informal sectors? (2) To what degree will the fund policy enhance the competitiveness of the formal sector? (3) How to determine the optimal recycling fee and subsidy to maximize social welfare and maintain a balanced budget for the disposal fund?…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Determining Recycling Fees and Subsidies in China’s WEEE Disposal Fund with Formal and Informal Sectors

Liu

Dou

et al. 2018

Sustainability

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At present, most of China’s waste electrical and electronic equipment (hereafter referred to as WEEE) flow into the informal recycling sector, which has no official disassembly certification. To regulate the WEEE recycling industry, the policy of the WEEE disposal fund has been implemented to levy recycling fees from producers and subsidize the formal recycling sector. This paper aims to solve the challenging problem of how to optimize recycling fees and subsidies. We first study the competition between the formal and informal sectors, and construct the game models of the dismantling and refurbishing processes. Based on the equilibrium outcomes, we then examine the impact of the disposal fund on producers, as well as the formal and informal recycling sectors. With the goal of maximizing social welfare and maintaining a balanced budget for the disposal fund, we study the optimal recycling fee levied on producers and the corresponding subsidy provided to the formal sector. Social welfare is a function of producer and formal-recycler profits, consumer surplus, and the negative externality caused by informal dismantling and refurbishing, such as environmental pollution and safety problems. Results show that the use of subsidy can increase the acquisition quantity of used products in the formal sector, but the increase will slow down with higher subsidy. If the recycling fee that producers are charged is small, social welfare will be improved. In addition, as the fee is increased, social welfare will rise first and then fall. As such, any excessive increase in recycling fees should be avoided.

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Dual Chains Competition under Two Recycling Modes Based on System Dynamics Method

Cited by 6 publications

References 34 publications

Recycling Model Selection for Electronic Products Considering Platform Power and Blockchain Empowerment

Recycling Model Selection for Electronic Products Considering Platform Power and Blockchain Empowerment

Big-Data-Based Power Battery Recycling for New Energy Vehicles: Information Sharing Platform and Intelligent Transportation Optimization

Determining Recycling Fees and Subsidies in China’s WEEE Disposal Fund with Formal and Informal Sectors

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