Price Discrimination and Retail Configuration

Shepard, Andrea

doi:10.1086/261739

Cited by 209 publications

(148 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…However, Katz (1984) and Borenstein (1985) present models that demonstrate that price discrimination can occur in free-entry markets. Shepard (1991) empirically verifies that price discrimination is consistent with competition by showing that variations in the prices of different grades of gasoline can not be attributed to cost, and thus constitute price discrimination in a fairly competitive market. Similarly, Graddy (1995) finds that third-degree price discrimination occurs even at the very competitive Fulton fish market.…”

Section: Previous Literaturementioning

confidence: 75%

Competition and Price Discrimination in the Market for Mailing Lists

2005

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This paper examines whether mailing list sellers, when faced with additional competitors, are more likely to try to segment consumers by offering additional choices at different prices (second-degree price discrimination) and/or offering different prices to readily identifiable groups of consumers (third-degree price discrimination). We utilize a dataset that includes information about all consumer response lists derived from mail order buyers (i.e. lists derived from catalogs) available for rental in 1997 and 2002. Our results indicate that increased competition leads to an increased propensity to price discriminate along each of the dimensions we investigate. These results hold for both second-degree and third-degree price discrimination. Further, list owners offer menus with more choices in more competitive markets. These

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Section: Previous Literaturementioning

confidence: 75%

Competition and Price Discrimination in the Market for Mailing Lists

2005

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“…Avalia também os efeitos da discriminação de preços sobre os preços cobrados para cada grupo, quantidade de produto alocado em cada mercado, e os consequentes impactos sobre bem-estar (ver os clássicos SCHMALENSEE (1981); VARIAN (1985) e (HOLMES (1989). Há ainda nessa área, além dos estudos teóricos, uma quantidade expressiva de trabalhos aplicados dedicados a avaliar empiricamente efeitos dessas estratégias de precificação (SHEPARD (1991); BORENSTEIN (1992); COHEN (2000) e McMANUS (2000)). Entretanto, não há nenhum estudo, sob nosso conhecimento, que avalie empiricamente efeitos de leis que "amarram" os preços cobrados a um grupo em preços cobrados a outros.…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

Os efeitos da criação de leis de meia entrada para estudantes sobre o consumo de bens e serviços culturais no Brasil

et al. 2016

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Resumo Este trabalho estima os efeitos da implementação de leis de meia entrada sobre o consumo de bens e serviços culturais dos estudantes brasileiros, utilizando as amostras coletadas para todas as regiões metropolitanas pelas Pesquisas de Orçamento Familiar (POF), realizadas em 1987/88, 1995/96, 2002/03 e 2008/09. Avaliam-se os efeitos das leis tanto sobre a proporção de estudantes consumidores de cultura, quanto sobre os gastos dos estudantes com esse tipo de serviço. Para estimar a possível relação causal existente, exploram-se as diferentes datas de criação das leis da meia entrada entre os estados brasileiros, utilizando-se as metodologias de Diferenças-em-Diferenças (DD) e Diferenças Triplas (DDD). Os resultados encontrados no presente trabalho sugerem que as leis de meia entrada tiveram impactos positivos tanto em termos de aumento na probabilidade de os estudantes consumirem bens e serviços culturais, quanto em elevar seus gastos com cultura.

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“…Similarly, other empirical works investigated the existence of second degree price discrimination in various markets with a specific emphasis on the effects of competition. These include Shepard (1991) (gasoline sales), Seim and Viard (2006) (cellular phone services), and Borzekowski, Thomadsen and Taragin (2006) (mailing lists). Lal and Rao (1997) studied competitive segmentation but in grocery retailing with the focus being on positioning and pricing.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Who should practice price discrimination using rebates in an asymmetric duopoly?

2009

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Price discrimination is generally thought to improve firm profits by allowing firms to extract more consumer surplus. In competition, however, price discrimination may also be costly to the firm because restrictive incentive compatibility conditions may allow the competing firm to gain market share at the discriminating firm's expense. Therefore, with asymmetric competition, it may be the case that one firm would let the other firm assume the burden of price discrimination. We investigate optimal segmentation in a market with two asymmetric firms and two heterogeneous consumer segments that differ in the importance of price and product attributes. In particular, we investigate second-degree price discrimination under competition with explicit incentive compatibility constraints thus extending prior work in marketing and economics. Focusing on the managerial implications, we explore whether it would be profitable for either or both firms to pursue a segmentation strategy using rebates as a mechanism. We identify conditions under which one or both firms would want to pursue such segmentation. We find that segmentation lessens competition for the less price-sensitive consumer segment and that this results in higher profits to both firms. A key to understanding this result is the customer remixing that segmentation leads to. We establish the key result that if firms are asymmetric in their attractiveness to consumers, the disadvantaged firm in our model is more likely to pursue a segmentation strategy than its rival in equilibrium. We then ask whether this result obtains in practice. To this end, we explore competitive segmentation empirically and are able to verify that disadvantaged firms indeed pursue segmentation through rebates with greater likelihood.

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Price Discrimination and Retail Configuration

Cited by 209 publications

References 7 publications

Competition and Price Discrimination in the Market for Mailing Lists

Competition and Price Discrimination in the Market for Mailing Lists

Os efeitos da criação de leis de meia entrada para estudantes sobre o consumo de bens e serviços culturais no Brasil

Who should practice price discrimination using rebates in an asymmetric duopoly?

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