S oftware product versioning (i.e., upgrading the product after its initial release) is a widely adopted practice followed by leading software providers such as Microsoft, Oracle, and IBM. Unlike conventional durable goods, software products are relatively easy to upgrade, making upgrades a strategic consideration in commercial software production. We consider a two-period model with a monopoly software provider who develops and releases a software product to the market. Unlike previous research, we consider demand variability and endogeneity to determine the functionality of the software in the first and second periods. Demand endogeneity is the impact of the word-of-mouth effect that positively relates the features in the initial release of the product to its demand in the second period. We also determine the design effort that should be spent in the first period to prepare for upgrading the product in the second period-upgrade design effort-to tap into the possible future demand. Results show that the upgrade design effort can be lower or higher when there is more market demand uncertainty. We also show that the features of the product in its initial release and upgrade design effort can be complements as well as substitutes, depending on the strength of the word-of-mouth effect. The results in this paper provide insights into how demand-side factors (market demand variability or demand endogeneity) can influence supply-side decisions (initial features and upgrade design effort). A key insight of the analysis is that a high word-of-mouth effect helps manage the product in the face of demand variability.

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The success of the Open Source model of software development depends on the voluntary participation of external developers (the peripheral developers ), a group that can have distinct motivations from that of project founders (the core developers ). In this study, we examine peripheral developer participation by empirically examining approximately 2,600 open source projects. In particular, we hypothesize that peripheral developer participation is higher when the potential for building reputation by gaining recognition from project stakeholders is higher. We consider recognition by internal stakeholders (such as core developers) and external stakeholders (such as end-users and peers). We find a positive association between peripheral developer participation and the potential of stakeholder recognition after controlling for bug reports, feature requests, and other key factors. Our findings provide important insights for OSS founders and corporate managers for open sourcing or OSS adoption decisions.

Price discrimination is generally thought to improve firm profits by allowing firms to extract more consumer surplus. In competition, however, price discrimination may also be costly to the firm because restrictive incentive compatibility conditions may allow the competing firm to gain market share at the discriminating firm's expense. Therefore, with asymmetric competition, it may be the case that one firm would let the other firm assume the burden of price discrimination. We investigate optimal segmentation in a market with two asymmetric firms and two heterogeneous consumer segments that differ in the importance of price and product attributes. In particular, we investigate second-degree price discrimination under competition with explicit incentive compatibility constraints thus extending prior work in marketing and economics. Focusing on the managerial implications, we explore whether it would be profitable for either or both firms to pursue a segmentation strategy using rebates as a mechanism. We identify conditions under which one or both firms would want to pursue such segmentation. We find that segmentation lessens competition for the less price-sensitive consumer segment and that this results in higher profits to both firms. A key to understanding this result is the customer remixing that segmentation leads to. We establish the key result that if firms are asymmetric in their attractiveness to consumers, the disadvantaged firm in our model is more likely to pursue a segmentation strategy than its rival in equilibrium. We then ask whether this result obtains in practice. To this end, we explore competitive segmentation empirically and are able to verify that disadvantaged firms indeed pursue segmentation through rebates with greater likelihood.

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Consumers need to exert effort to use the incentives provided in a promotion campaign. This effort is critical in the consumers' decision process and for the success of the campaign. We develop a model of consumer redemption effort that is general in nature and is applicable to coupons, rebates, and other price-discrimination devices. We find that the impact of redemption effort is quite intricate on a firm's profit and consumers' surplus. We find that there are cases where a firm would like to operate in a low redemption cost environment while consumers would be better off with higher costs. We identify cases where price can remain the same with or without the promotion. In these cases, it is possible that the surplus for each individual consumer is higher when a firm price discriminates and improves its profit. Our results indicate that a firm would rather have variation in consumer redemption costs than to have variation in consumer valuations. However, in a market with low valuation variability, consumer redemption cost variability is essential for an efficient promotion campaign. Therefore, the markets that naturally have a lot of variability in consumer valuations should be the ones targeted for online promotion programs that reduce consumer effort levels, not the markets with low variability.

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