Preventing Sybil Attack in Blockchain using Distributed Behavior Monitoring of Miners

Swathi, P.; Modi, Chirag; Patel, Dhiren

doi:10.1109/icccnt45670.2019.8944507

Cited by 52 publications

(32 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…In [18], Douceur discussed the Sybil attack on P2P systems. The P2P systems do not rely on a central trusted party chain of trust to verify the identity of each participant node, also relatively cheap to generate identities on P2P systems that treat equally on the network [26], [94].…”

Section: ) Sybil Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Additionally, blockchain systems include valuable digital assets that motivate the attackers to execute this attack. Once fake identities gain recognition in the blockchain system, the attacker interrupts the flow of information, out-votes (or block) the honest nodes, and refuses to receive or transmit information [24], [94]. The threats spectrum is increasing on blockchain systems, and the attacker has different motives to carry out this attack.…”

Section: ) Sybil Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Once the honest nodes connect with Sybil nodes, the attacker can intercept the traffic and delay block propagation to affect the transaction verification. Moreover, the poor implementation of node authentication when joining the blockchain network [94]. For instance, no network joining fee, not validating IP address, or source of node connection.…”

Section: ) Nodes Isolation (Partition) Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Exploring Sybil and Double-Spending Risks in Blockchain Systems

Iqbal

Matulevičius

2021

IEEE Access

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This paper is partially supported by the ERASMUS+ sectoral alliance program on A Blueprint for sectoral cooperation on blockchain skills and development (CHAISE), project code 621646-EPP-1-2020-1-FREPPK2-SSA-B. The European Commission support for the production of this publication does not constitute endorsement of the contents which reflects the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

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Section: ) Sybil Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: ) Sybil Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: ) Nodes Isolation (Partition) Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Exploring Sybil and Double-Spending Risks in Blockchain Systems

Iqbal

Matulevičius

2021

IEEE Access

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“…However, it is vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) and Sybil attacks [68]. A Sybil attacker can create many forged identities to break the trustworthiness of the system [98,99]. CryptoNote utilized a ring signature to provide viable anonymity benefits, but it brings higher computational complexity.…”

Section: Conceptual Research Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

Blockchain System Defensive Overview for Double-Spend and Selfish Mining Attacks: A Systematic Approach

et al. 2021

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“…Alachkar and Gaastra 78 studied existing solutions for the mitigation of Sybil attacks on I2P networks and showed that the state of these networks makes them subject to the Sybil attack. Several solutions have been proposed to identify and prevent Sybil attack, one can cite 79‐81 …”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Permissionless proof‐of‐reputation‐X: A hybrid reputation‐based consensus algorithm for permissionless blockchains

Abdo

Sibai

Demerjian

2020

Trans Emerging Tel Tech

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Over the past years, blockchain technology has become more and more interesting since its ability to carry out transactions without any mediator. To ensure the transactions' reliability, consensus algorithms are adopted by blockchain technology. However, due to the failure of consensus algorithms in managing nodes' identities, blockchain technology is considered inappropriate for many applications. In this article, we propose the permissionless proof‐of‐reputation‐X (PL‐PoRX) that upgrades an existing consensus algorithm, the proof‐of‐reputation‐X (PoRX). PL‐PoRX replaces the trusted identity database in PoRX with a new admission process to make the algorithm suitable for permissionless blockchains, while maintaining PoRX's reputation mechanism. Several experiments are conducted to show the efficiency of our approach under different scenarios. We also debate the security model of the new protocol and study its time complexity. The results show that PL‐PoRX decreases the number of blocks issued by malicious miners, and help benign miners build reputation faster.

show abstract

Preventing Sybil Attack in Blockchain using Distributed Behavior Monitoring of Miners

Cited by 52 publications

References 22 publications

Exploring Sybil and Double-Spending Risks in Blockchain Systems

Exploring Sybil and Double-Spending Risks in Blockchain Systems

Blockchain System Defensive Overview for Double-Spend and Selfish Mining Attacks: A Systematic Approach

Permissionless proof‐of‐reputation‐X: A hybrid reputation‐based consensus algorithm for permissionless blockchains

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