Presidents as Agents of Change

Abstract

Presidents have long been seen as operating within a political environment that is intractable and highly resistant to change. Recent historical‐institutional research, however, has revealed presidents to be powerful agents of structural change. Building on this emergent literature, this article endeavors to demonstrate that Terry Moe's tripartite analytical framework—of structures, incentives, and resources—remains a helpful starting point for historically oriented scholars seeking to examine the relationship between presidential behavior and institutional change. It offers methodological suggestions for conducting historical research along these lines and illustrates the potential gains by reconsidering some recent research into the relationship between presidential action and party development. Each illustration shows that presidents, through their instrumental efforts to bring inherited party structures into closer alignment with their incentives, contributed to long‐term party developments. Rather than leave their structural environment undisturbed, as leading theories might predict, their actions reconfigured party arrangements and altered their trajectories, influencing the choices made by subsequent presidents and other political actors.

Presidential Influence in an Era of Congressional Dominance

“…Prior to the twentieth century, presidents were seen as largely unable to provide strong leadership except in instances of national crisis (Bryce 1888). 1 Nineteenth-century presidents are commonly regarded as “very ordinary people with very ordinary reputations” (Lowi 1986, 40) whose ambitions were constrained largely by the nature of the party system (Galvin 2014; Klinghard 2010). Instead, the nineteenth century was “the golden age of the legislature” (Lowi 1986, 30) and the president was merely “the servant of Congress” (Wilson 1885, 213).…”

Ceder e controlar o poder: estratégias presidenciais para coordenação governamental no Brasil

“…Outras pesquisas têm reforçado a argumentação de Moe quanto à complementaridade da utilização desses instrumentos de controle, mostrando que os presidentes historicamente se deparam com incentivos institucionais para politizar e, ao mesmo tempo, centralizar as áreas que são mais importantes em sua agenda, aumentando a capacidade gerencial da Presidência (Galvin;Shoogan, 2004). Dessa forma, ao invés de deixar intacta aquela estrutura, os presidentes acabam atuando para alterá-la, influenciando as escolhas disponíveis para seus sucessores.…”

“…Dessa forma, ao invés de deixar intacta aquela estrutura, os presidentes acabam atuando para alterá-la, influenciando as escolhas disponíveis para seus sucessores. São, portanto, "agentes de mudança" da própria estrutura da Presidência (Galvin, 2014).…”

The Fed’s Political Economy

“…An enduring coalition of the Fed, presidents, and congressional committees with ostensible oversight responsibilities for the Fed (i.e., the House Finance Services Committee and the Senate Banking Committee) supports and defends the central bank’s prerogatives and accommodation of finance (Hertel-Fernandez 2016). Presidents are motivated primarily by the need to sustain a stable financial system and to create favorable conditions for the reelection of themselves and their party (Galvin 2014). Legislators—along with presidents—are drawn to campaign contributions from finance as well as to lucrative jobs and speaking fees after they leave office (Skocpol and Hertel-Fernandez 2016).…”