2019
DOI: 10.1017/s0021855319000056
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Presidential Term Limits and the African Union

Abstract: A growing number of states have modified constitutionally determined presidential term limits or adopted a flexible interpretation of relevant constitutional provisions to allow incumbent leaders additional terms in the highest office. This article investigates African Union (AU) responses to attempts to overturn or weaken term limits on executive power, one of the most tenacious constitutional trends in Africa. Inspired by the AU's well-established discourse on “unconstitutional changes of government” under t… Show more

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Cited by 16 publications
(9 citation statements)
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References 21 publications
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“…The constraining power of the precedent could work even at the international level. While African regional organisations enjoy limited coercive power in the domestic politics of their members (Wiebusch and Murray, 2019), the virtuous behaviour of the regional peers could informally act as a deterrent against ETL manipulation by raising its reputational cost. Developmental assistance is another international factor we should consider.…”
Section: Manipulating Etls: Incentives Deterrents Easing Factors Amentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The constraining power of the precedent could work even at the international level. While African regional organisations enjoy limited coercive power in the domestic politics of their members (Wiebusch and Murray, 2019), the virtuous behaviour of the regional peers could informally act as a deterrent against ETL manipulation by raising its reputational cost. Developmental assistance is another international factor we should consider.…”
Section: Manipulating Etls: Incentives Deterrents Easing Factors Amentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Le Pays 2014bParticularly voices from Burkinabe civil society criticized the non-reaction of both organizations to Compaoré's attempt to change the constitution, which was what necessitated the popular uprising in the first place: Now that the Burkinabe people are winning their struggle, ECOWAS wants to intervene to oppose a coup d'état, whereas Blaise Compaoré had carried out a constitutional coup d'état [authors' translation]. (youth movement 'Balai citoyen' quoted in Le Pays 2014c) The criticism of being 'doctors after death' thus also addressed the normative foundation of APSA: it entailed a demand for stronger action against unconstitutional actions by incumbents to prolong their period in power and for expanded regional measures to prevent such situations, for instance by specifying limits on terms in office (Le Pays 2014a, 2014e; see generally Wiebusch and Murray 2019).…”
Section: Burkina Faso: Contesting Regional Intervention In Times Of Pmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Other authors considered the influence of the values and principles enshrined in the ACDEG on specific policy areas, like transitional justice in post-conflict societies (Murithi, 2018). Furthermore, other contributors evaluated the usage of the ACDEG in the context of governance disruptions during constitutional manipulations to prolong presidential tenure (Wiebusch and Murray, 2019) or during popular uprisings (Bakr 2018; Dersso, 2019; Manirakiza, 2019). Another perspective adopted by authors entailed zooming in on the quality of key democratic institutions regulated to varying degrees by the ACDEG, such as political parties (Magolowondo, 2018) or election management bodies (Kioko, 2019).…”
Section: Continental Encounters With Democratic Governancementioning
confidence: 99%