Autocratisation by Term Limits Manipulation in Sub-Saharan Africa

Cassani, Andrea

doi:10.1177/0002039720964218

Cited by 13 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…Term limits have been a key target for Africa's contemporary would-be autocrats who tried, and quite often managed, to cling on to power (Reyntjens 2020). Scholars investigated the motives that could either elicit or discourage African leaders' attempts to manipulate term limits (Posner and Young 2018), the strategies adopted (Tull and Simons 2017) and the factors affecting the probability of success (Cassani 2020; Dulani 2011; Hartmann 2022; see also Baturo 2014; McKie 2019).…”

Section: Time's Upmentioning

confidence: 99%

Africa's Lame Ducks: Second-Term Presidents and the Rule of Law

Carbone

Cassani

2023

Gov. & oppos.

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The vast majority of sub-Saharan countries have adopted constitutional clauses establishing that elected presidents cannot serve more than two mandates. While an extensive literature has examined why African leaders comply with or else try to manipulate term limits, the policy implications of the latter remain unexplored. Existing studies of other world regions suggest that setting a maximum number of terms presidents can serve tends to make them ‘lame ducks’ during their final mandate. We reconsider this argument, and posit and demonstrate empirically that constitutional limits can actually induce positive effects on second-term presidents' actions compared to their first terms. More specifically, the absence of electoral pressures, the concern for their post-presidential future and legacy-building motivations may lead to improvements in the rule of law, especially regarding the functioning of the judiciary. This article represents the first empirical investigation of the performance of Africa's second-term lame-duck presidents.

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Section: Time's Upmentioning

confidence: 99%

Africa's Lame Ducks: Second-Term Presidents and the Rule of Law

Carbone

Cassani

2023

Gov. & oppos.

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“…32 For instance, it is contended that incumbency advantage potentially leads a regime to descend into tyranny. 33 An incumbent, being in better possession of knowledge of the internal system and its governance, develops the tendency to exact compliance from the electorate. This inclination in turn leads to a cyclical pattern of compliance and retribution for defiance, and subsequently tyranny.…”

Section: Term Limits and Democracymentioning

confidence: 99%

Unconstitutional constitutional amendment or constitutional dismemberment? A reappraisal of the presidential term limit amendment in Cameroon

Enonchong

2022

Glob. Con.

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Presidential term limit provisions are often perceived as a feature of modern democratic systems. It has been argued that their existence is a key intervention mechanism to pre-empt some undemocratic outcomes associated with incumbency advantages. In 2008, the Constitution of Cameroon was amended to abolish the presidential term limit. More than ten years on, there are ostensible signs of a democratic decline. This article takes a retrospective look at the constitutional amendment to assess its constitutionality. It is argued that a conclusion on the constitutionality of the amendment may not be unequivocal. Nevertheless, there are substantial grounds for considering the constitutional change as a constitutional dismemberment. This is premised on the fact that, although the amendment followed the normal rules for constitutional amendments, the transformation amounted to a fundamental break with the constitutional commitment to democracy that underpinned the adoption of the 1996 Constitution.

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“…several african countries displayed this lack of total control in presidential bids to extend or abolish executive term limits; usually, the executive is successful in such attempts. When they do fail, however, it is often due to resistance in parliament (Cassani 2020). Critically, such resistance takes place within the ranks of both opposition and government party MPs.…”

Section: African Legislaturesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Legislative Agenda in 13 African Countries: A Comprehensive Database

Frantzeskakis

Seeberg

2022

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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While African legislatures have been receiving increasing academic attention in recent years, efforts to expand our understanding of these institutional bodies have been hampered by a dearth of reliable quantitative data regarding their activity and output. To rectify this issue, we have collected and issue‐classified data on the legislative agenda in 13 African countries. We leverage this new dataset to explore how democratic development affects the legislative agenda. We show that legislatures in more democratic countries have a larger, broader, and more dynamic agenda, and we propose an extensive future research agenda for legislative politics in Africa.

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Autocratisation by Term Limits Manipulation in Sub-Saharan Africa

Cited by 13 publications

References 45 publications

Africa's Lame Ducks: Second-Term Presidents and the Rule of Law

Africa's Lame Ducks: Second-Term Presidents and the Rule of Law

Unconstitutional constitutional amendment or constitutional dismemberment? A reappraisal of the presidential term limit amendment in Cameroon

The Legislative Agenda in 13 African Countries: A Comprehensive Database

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