Presidential Capital and the Supreme Court Confirmation Process

Abstract

The Supreme Court nomination and confirmation process has become one of the most contentious aspects of American politics in recent years, representing a seismic struggle between the president and the U.S. Senate over the ideological makeup of the nation's highest court. Existing research focuses on how the ideological compatibility of the president and the Senate affects the ideology of the president's nominees. However, little work addresses whether presidents can overcome an ideologically hostile Senate by spending political capital to support a nominee. As such, we examine the president's public expenditure of capital to obtain confirmation for Supreme Court nominees facing a Senate that is reticent to confirm. By content analyzing public statements made by presidents during confirmation battles we find strong support for the hypothesis that presidents strategically “go public.” Further, this strategy has a marked influence on presidents’ ability to win confirmation for their most important nominees. “Tell your senators to resist the politicization of our court system. Tell them you support the appointment of Judge Bork.” —President Ronald Reagan, 1987

Pivotal Politics, Presidential Capital, and Supreme Court Nominations

“…In our own previous work we find that presidents are strategic in their use of political capital, as they are more likely to make public statements on behalf of nominees when a nominee is ideologically distant from the Senate (Johnson and Roberts 2004). 15 More generally, we find empirical support for the argument that presidents are able to change votes on confirmations by "going public" (Kernell 1997) on Supreme Court nominees.…”

Qualifications or Philosophy? The Use of Blue Slips in a Polarized Era

“…Nemacheck () illustrates that when presidents make Supreme Court nominations, they follow either an informational strategy or a political strategy, depending on the composition of the Senate. Moraski and Shipan () and, later, Johnson and Roberts () further show that the president's selection turns on the identity of relevant legislative pivots.…”

Counting Congress In: Patterns of Success in Judicial Nomination Requests by Members of Congress to Presidents Eisenhower and Ford

“…A good deal has also been written concerning the desire of presidents to appoint similar-minded individuals to judicial positions (Giles et al, 2001;Hettinger, Lindquist, & Martinek, 2006;Massaro, 1990). With this in mind, the second hypothesis argues that presidents look more favorably on requests made by Members of Congress who share their ideological viewpoint (Johnson & Roberts, 2004;Segal, Cameron, & Cover, 1992;Segal & Spaeth, 2002). In this perspective, the president rewards those ideologically close to him by granting their requests for judicial nominees, who could be roughly assumed to share the ideology of the requesting Member of Congress, and who are also ideologically aligned with the president.…”