We construct the complete network of 26,681 majority opinions written by the U.S. Supreme Court and the cases that cite them from 1791 to 2005. We describe a method for using the patterns in citations within and across cases to create importance scores that identify the most legally relevant precedents in the network of Supreme Court law at any given point in time. Our measures are superior to existing network-based alternatives and, for example, offer information regarding case importance not evident in simple citation counts. We also demonstrate the validity of our measures by showing that they are strongly correlated with the future citation behavior of state courts, the U.S. Courts of Appeals, and the U.S. Supreme Court. In so doing, we show that network analysis is a viable way of measuring how central a case is to law at the Court and suggest that it can be used to measure other legal concepts.
W e posit that Supreme Court oral arguments provide justices with useful information that influences their final votes on the merits. To examine the role of these proceedings, we ask the following questions: (1) what factors influence the quality of arguments presented to the Court; and, more importantly, (2) does the quality of a lawyer's oral argument affect the justices' final votes on the merits? We answer these questions by utilizing a unique data source--evaluations Justice Blackmun made of the quality of oral arguments presented to the justices. Our analysis shows that Justice Blackmun's grading of attorneys is somewhat influenced by conventional indicators of the credibility of attorneys and are not simply the product of Justice Blackmun's ideological leanings. We thus suggest they can plausibly be seen as measuring the quality of oral argument. We further show that the probability of a justice voting for a litigant increases dramatically if that litigant's lawyer presents better oral arguments than the competing counsel. These results therefore indicate that this element of the Court's decisional process affects final votes on the merits, and it has implications for how other elite decision makers evaluate and use information.
To investigate the effect of the Supreme Court on public opinion, we offer the conditional response hypothesis based on a theory of Supreme Court legitimacy and a microlevel social-psychological theory of attitude formation. Together these theories predict that the Court may affect public opinion when it initially rules on a salient issue, but that subsequent decisions on the same issue will have little influence on opinion. To test our predictions, we analyze public opinion data before and after the Supreme Court ruled in a highly visible abortion case (Webster v. Reproductive Health Services [1989]) and before and after three key capital punishment rulings (Furman v. Georgia [1972], Gregg v. Georgia [1976], and McCleskey v. Kemp [1987]). The results suggest that our theory is not issue bound but is generally applicable to how the Supreme Court affects public opinion when it rules in highly salient cases.
The Supreme Court nomination and confirmation process has become one of the most contentious aspects of American politics in recent years, representing a seismic struggle between the president and the U.S. Senate over the ideological makeup of the nation's highest court. Existing research focuses on how the ideological compatibility of the president and the Senate affects the ideology of the president's nominees. However, little work addresses whether presidents can overcome an ideologically hostile Senate by spending political capital to support a nominee. As such, we examine the president's public expenditure of capital to obtain confirmation for Supreme Court nominees facing a Senate that is reticent to confirm. By content analyzing public statements made by presidents during confirmation battles we find strong support for the hypothesis that presidents strategically “go public.” Further, this strategy has a marked influence on presidents’ ability to win confirmation for their most important nominees. “Tell your senators to resist the politicization of our court system. Tell them you support the appointment of Judge Bork.” —President Ronald Reagan, 1987
Conventional wisdom in judicial politics is that oral arguments play little if any role in how the Supreme Court makes decisions. A primary reason for this view is that insufficient evidence exists to test this hypothesis. Thus, I ask, do Supreme Court justices use information from oral arguments that may help them make decisions as close as possible to their preferred goals? My answer is straightforward: An investigation of the oral arguments and the Court's majority opinions in a sample of cases from the Burger Court era shows that the Court gathers information during oral arguments and then uses this information when making substantive policy choices. This finding has clear implications for the way in which scholars view the Supreme Court's decision-making process, as it suggests that the accepted view of where oral arguments fit into this process is far from accurate.
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