Presidencialismo y coaliciones de gobierno en América Latina: Un análisis del papel de las instituciones

Abstract

RESUMENLa literatura dominante en ciencia política ha tendido, en los últimos años, a conferirle a las instituciones un papel central en la formación, el desempeño y la caída de gobiernos. Los trabajos acerca de coaliciones de gobierno no escapan, en su gran mayoría, a esa influencia neoinstitucionalista. A la luz de la reciente reforma constitucional aprobada en México, y que abre la posibilidad inédita de formar coaliciones de gobierno, nos empeñaremos en recompilar los principales argumentos respecto del supuesto impacto de las instituciones y los testearemos, mediante las experiencias latinoamericanas de gobiernos de coalición, usando un método de análisis configuracional (QCA). De esta forma podremos matizar los impactos de las instituciones en los gobiernos de coalición.Palabras claves: Neoinstitucionalismo, gobiernos de coalición, presidencialismo, América Latina, QCA. ABSTRACT Mainstream literature in political science confers to institutions a key role in the formation

Coalition Presidentialism in Bicameral Congresses: How does the Control of a Bicameral Majority Affect Coalition Survival?

“…Indeed, it states that a moderate number of partners (03 to 05) would behave better (or more efficiently) than the possible minimal number of coalition partners (02). This situation has already been pointed to in previous work (ALBALA, 2016) and can be explained by the fact that a two-party coalition tends 01. to be formed by parties with similar political strengths that compete for the electoral leadership of their political pole, or 02. tends to be unbalanced, with one asymmetrically dominant party and another being a circumstantial partner (RENIU and ALBALA, 2012). Both cases, indeed, favour the generation of potential tensions or disagreement.…”

“…This is probably due to a different electoral rule for electing senators, which makes every seat in the Senate more costly, conferring to every individual senator a much greater value and influence than representatives of lower chambers. Albala (2016). Notes: In the last column, I marked those cases that could not reach a majority with the value '0'; those that reached a majority in one chamber with the value '1'; and those that reached a bicameral majority with the value '2'.…”

Bicameralism and Coalition Cabinets in Presidential Polities: A configurational analysis of the coalition formation and duration processes

“…I assigned a value ‘1’ for pre-electoral coalitions and a value ‘0’ for coalitions that formed only at a post-electoral stage. In another work, I have shown that coalition cabinets usually form at a pre-electoral stage (Albala, 2016).…”

“…The findings of this first ‘wave’ were that more than half of the governments in Latin America since 1958 have been coalition governments. Moreover, some countries such as Brazil and Chile have experienced only this type of government (Albala, 2016).…”

“…As a main external constraint, we included the institutional variable ( H3 ). Indeed, most scholars working on government coalitions in presidential systems have established that the institutional system operates as a strong constraint against the temptation to walk away (Albala, 2016). As Altman (2001) set out, the proximity of a new election is a strong incentive for walking away.…”