Presentism, truthmakers and distributional properties

Corkum, Phil

doi:10.1007/s11229-014-0456-8

Cited by 19 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…For discussion, see Trogdon (2009Trogdon ( , 2010 and Skiles (2009). And Tallant and Ingram (2012a, b) and Corkum (2014) argue that there are reasons specific to presentism why presentists should not use distributional properties as truthmakers for past claims; for discussion see Cameron (2013) and Green (2017).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Distributional properties have been put to work in a variety of explanatory tasks in recent metaphysics, including: responding to the truthmaker objection to presentism 5 ; providing an analysis of change 6 ; giving to priority monists an account of basic heterogeneous entities 7 ; giving to existence monists an explanation how the 4 I discuss Parson's argument only briefly-in part because the issue is peripheral to the salience objection, in part because one can simply stipulate that the distributional property is irreducible, and in part since I discuss the argument at length in Corkum (2014). 5 Cameron (2008Cameron ( , 2011Cameron ( , 2013; discussed in Caplan and Sanson (2011), Tallant andIngram (2012a, b, 2015), Cameron (2013), Effingham (2013), Davidson (2013), Corkum (2014), Green (2017). 6 Parsons (2000Parsons ( , 2004, Cameron (2008Cameron ( , 2011.…”

Section: Distributionalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Alternatively, these theorists may simply stipulate that there are relevant irreducible distributed properties. For example, Cameron (2008Cameron ( , 2011 appeals to distributed properties so to provide truthmakers for past claims; in response, Corkum (2014) argues that presentists lack an attractive non-stipulative defense of such an approach. Green (2017) defends this strategy of stipulation.…”

Section: Writesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Salience and metaphysical explanation

Corkum

2021

Synthese

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Metaphysical explanations, unlike many other kinds of explanation, are standardly thought to be insensitive to our epistemic situation and so are not evaluable by cognitive values such as salience. I consider a case study that challenges this view. Some properties are distributed over an extension. For example, the property of being polka-dotted red on white, when instantiated, is distributed over a surface. Similar properties have been put to work in a variety of explanatory tasks in recent metaphysics, including: providing an analysis of change, giving to presentists truthmakers for past claims; giving to priority monists an account of basic heterogeneous entities; and giving to friends of extended simples an explanation of how an extended simple can enjoy qualitative variation. I argue that such explanations exhibit salience failure. How ought we represent the semantics of salience? Differences in linguistic stress induce semantic differences similar to the semantic differences induced in explanations by differences in salience, and I will draw an analogy with linguistic theories of focus sensitivity to sketch how one might model the role of salience in these kinds of explanations. I end with a few tentative conclusions about the role of cognitive values in metaphysical explanations. Some theorists view the citation of a ground as a sufficient explanation. If certain explanations appealing to distributed properties exhibit attenuated salience, then arguably the mere citation of a ground does not always provide an adequate explanation.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Distributionalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Writesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Salience and metaphysical explanation

Corkum

2021

Synthese

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“…This would avoid the above problem as TDP make an intrinsic difference to the objects that instantiate them. However, this solution has its own problems(Corkum 2014) and has the unfortunate consequence that grounding theorists that want to provide mechanistic explanations of the grounding of mental and referential facts are committed to a specific and controversial view of properties.…”

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Some Spanners in the Works of Grounding Mechanisms Removed

Stenwall

2021

Axiomathes

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In this paper I address two concerns with Kelly Trogdon’s grounding mechanism view, i.e. the idea that metaphysical explanation can be modeled on causal-mechanical explanation. The first concern threatens to undermine the unity that grounding-mechanical explanations imposes on metaphysical explanation; and the second concern requires the grounding mechanic to put forth a formal condition on grounding-mechanical models. After having discussed both of these, I provide a solution to the first and argue that the second concern is unwarranted.

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A Theory of Truthmaking

Asay

2020

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In the Introduction, I explained why we should take truthmaking seriously. One important moral to be drawn from that discussion is that the idea of truthmaking is alive and well in philosophy, even if sometimes left implicit. It is not just self-identified truthmaker theorists, then, who deploy the notion of truthmaking. However, it is truthmaker theorists who believe that framing metaphysical questions in terms of truthmaking is a useful way of defending and objecting to metaphysical positions. In fact, this is how I conceive of what it is to be a truthmaker theorist. To be a truthmaker theorist is not to accept any particular metaphysical doctrine; as we shall see, nearly every thesis under discussion within truthmaker theory is contentious. Rather, it is to adopt a methodology, to confront metaphysical questions with the tools and resources of truthmaker theory.  As a result, taking truthmaking seriously does not require taking on the most controversial commitments that have long been associated with it, such as the doctrine that all truths require truthmakers, or that entities such as facts or states of affairs exist. Those are positions that one may ultimately stake out, but they are not compulsory.But what form should such truthmaking arguments take? What kind of theory should truthmaker theorists endeavor to produce? What assumptions are truthmaker theorists allowed to hold when exploring their inquiries? These sorts of questions raise methodological issues for truthmaker theorists, and are of the first importance when developing comprehensive theories of truthmaking. Those who make casual appeals to the notion of truthmaking will also benefit from some reflection on truthmaker methodology, as it is easy to fall into tempting assumptions about truthmaking that are ultimately optional. Hence I could not disagree more with the very first sentence of Dodd (): "To be a truthmaker theorist is to commit oneself to a principle stating that the members of a certain class of true propositions have truthmakers" ().

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Presentism, truthmakers and distributional properties

Cited by 19 publications

References 35 publications

Salience and metaphysical explanation

Salience and metaphysical explanation

Some Spanners in the Works of Grounding Mechanisms Removed

A Theory of Truthmaking

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