A Theory of Truthmaking

Abstract

In the Introduction, I explained why we should take truthmaking seriously. One important moral to be drawn from that discussion is that the idea of truthmaking is alive and well in philosophy, even if sometimes left implicit. It is not just self-identified truthmaker theorists, then, who deploy the notion of truthmaking. However, it is truthmaker theorists who believe that framing metaphysical questions in terms of truthmaking is a useful way of defending and objecting to metaphysical positions. In fact, this is how I conceive of what it is to be a truthmaker theorist. To be a truthmaker theorist is not to accept any particular metaphysical doctrine; as we shall see, nearly every thesis under discussion within truthmaker theory is contentious. Rather, it is to adopt a methodology, to confront metaphysical questions with the tools and resources of truthmaker theory.  As a result, taking truthmaking seriously does not require taking on the most controversial commitments that have long been associated with it, such as the doctrine that all truths require truthmakers, or that entities such as facts or states of affairs exist. Those are positions that one may ultimately stake out, but they are not compulsory.But what form should such truthmaking arguments take? What kind of theory should truthmaker theorists endeavor to produce? What assumptions are truthmaker theorists allowed to hold when exploring their inquiries? These sorts of questions raise methodological issues for truthmaker theorists, and are of the first importance when developing comprehensive theories of truthmaking. Those who make casual appeals to the notion of truthmaking will also benefit from some reflection on truthmaker methodology, as it is easy to fall into tempting assumptions about truthmaking that are ultimately optional. Hence I could not disagree more with the very first sentence of Dodd (): "To be a truthmaker theorist is to commit oneself to a principle stating that the members of a certain class of true propositions have truthmakers" ().

Certainty in an Uncertain World: Toward A Critical Theory of Opinion

“…For this, the analytic tradition of contemporary epistemology has responded with the virtue of precision and has actively produced a number of important debates on the so-called 'post-truth' condition. Here, where the very idea of truth seems to be in crisis, emphasis has been placed on questions of epistemic norms, ideals, and beliefs (Bernecker, Flowerree, and Grundmann, 2021;Cassam, 2019), rhetoric (Fuller, 2017), trust and the philosophy of science (Marmot, 2017;Oreskes, 2019), issues of realism (Asay, 2020), relativism (Baghramian and Coliva, 2020), and speech act theory (Finlayson, 2019), as well as modes of counterfactual or fictional reasoning (Williamson, 2021) and in the fields of the philosophy of language (Marques, 2020) and metaethics more generally (Brown, 2019).…”

Two Concepts of Truthmaking: a Compatibilist Solution to the Controversy Between Substantive and Deflationary Approach

“…On the other hand, regarding the nature of truthmaking relations, substantivists, in addition to necessitation (Fox 1987;Maurin 2010;Rodriguez-Pereyra 2005), also adopted its derivatives such as entailment (Restall 1996), co-entailment (Smith and Simon 2007), projection (Smith 1999), or essential dependence (Lowe 2005). 4 In addition, they also used grounding (Griffith 2014;Rodriguez-Pereyra 2005) or said that the task of truthmaking is to provide ontology (Asay 2018(Asay , 2020Asay and Baron 2020). Following (Merricks 2007: 96), I also include supervenience in substantive truthmaking, which is used by some authors (Bigelow 1988;Lewis 2001).…”

“…The tension between different functions of truthmaking can be seen in the debate (Asay 2018(Asay , 2020Baron et al 2022;Kitamura 2022;Rodriguez-Pereyra 2022;Tałasiewicz et al 2013). Participants in the debate distinguish two main functions of truthmaking: providing truth and providing ontology.…”

“…Participants in the debate distinguish two main functions of truthmaking: providing truth and providing ontology. However, recently, there are also authors who distinguish the function of providing explanation as well (Asay 2018(Asay , 2020; see also Kitamura 2022;Rodriguez-Pereyra 2022). Moreover, authors do not stop at distinguishing the different functions of truthmaking.…”

“…Contrary to incompatibilism, I argue that we can adopt a compatibilist position and maintain both substantive and deflationary truthmaking. For this, I refer to the debate on the functions of truthmaking (see Asay 2018Asay , 2020Kitamura 2022;Tałasiewicz et al 2013). It seems that incompatibilists assume that truthmaking should serve only one function.…”