Preliminary Observations on Tickling Oneself

Weiskrantz, Lawrence; Elliott, John; Darlington, C. D.

doi:10.1038/230598a0

Cited by 243 publications

(175 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…We have previously shown that normal control subjects perceive self-produced tactile stimuli as less intense, tickly and pleasant than externally produced tactile stimuli (Blakemore et al 1999), supporting and expanding on a study by Weiskrantz et al (1971). We interpreted these results in terms of sensory predictions made by a forward model of the motor system ( Fig.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 83%

The perception of self-produced sensory stimuli in patients with auditory hallucinations and passivity experiences: evidence for a breakdown in self-monitoring

et al. 2000

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 83%

The perception of self-produced sensory stimuli in patients with auditory hallucinations and passivity experiences: evidence for a breakdown in self-monitoring

et al. 2000

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“…They begin with the observation that tactile stimulation produced by one's own movements are less intense than those produced by the same movement but done by another person (see for example Bays, Wolpert, et al, 2005;Shergill, Bays, et al, 2003). That is, one cannot tickle oneself (Claxton, 1975;Weiskrantz, Elliot, et al, 1971). This cannot be explained by movement alone (as it is in some conditions, see e.g.…”

Section: Self Ticklingmentioning

confidence: 99%

The case for the comparator model as an explanation of the sense of agency and its breakdowns

Carruthers

2012

Consciousness and Cognition

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a b s t r a c t I compare Frith and colleagues' influential comparator account of how the sense of agency is elicited to the multifactorial weighting model advocated by Synofzik and colleagues. I defend the comparator model from the common objection that the actual sensory consequences of action are not needed to elicit the sense of agency. I examine the comparator model's ability to explain the performance of healthy subjects and those suffering from delusions of alien control on various self-attribution tasks. It transpires that the comparator model needs case-by-case adjustment to deal with problematic data. In response to this, the multifactorial weighting model of Synofzik and colleagues is introduced. Although this model is incomplete, it is more naturally constrained by the cases that are problematic for the comparator model. However, this model may be untestable. I conclude that currently the comparator model approach has stronger support than the multifactorial weighting model approach.

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“…Evidence in favour of the first comparator (comparison between predicted and actual sensory feedback) stems from a study by Blakemore et al, who showed -based on earlier work by Weiskrantz et al (1971) that humans attenuate the sensory response to self-generated stimulation as illustrated by the fact that one cannot tickle oneself (Blakemore et al, 1998b(Blakemore et al, , 2000. Evidence in favour of the second comparator (comparison between predicted and actual states of the motor system) and the understanding that the internal model of sensorimotor control functions as an optimal state estimator is provided by Wolpert et al (1995).…”

Section: Automatic Sensorimotor Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

Agency, gait and self-consciousness

Kannape

Blanke

2012

International Journal of Psychophysiology

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Agency is an important aspect of bodily self-consciousness, allowing us to separate own movements from those induced by the environment and to distinguish own movements from those of other agents. Unsurprisingly, theoretical frameworks for agency such as central monitoring are closely tied to computational models of sensorimotor control. Until recently agency research has largely focussed on goal-directed movements of the upper limbs. In particular, the influence of performance-related sensory cues and the relevance of prediction signals for agency judgements have been studied through a variety of spatio-temporal mismatches between movement and the sensory consequences of movement. However, agents often perform a different type of movement; highly automated movements that involve the entire body such as walking, cycling, and swimming with potentially different agency mechanisms. Here, we review recent work about agency for full-body movements such as gait, highlighting the effects of performance-related visual and auditory cues on gait agency. Gait movements differ from upper limb actions. Gait is cyclic, more rarely immediately goal-directed, and is generally considered one of the most automatic and unconscious actions. We discuss such movement differences with respect to the functional mechanisms of full-body agency and body-part agency by linking these gait agency paradigms to computational models of motor control. This is followed by a selective review of gait control, locomotion, and models of motor control relying on prediction signals and underlining their relevance for full-body agency.

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Preliminary Observations on Tickling Oneself

Cited by 243 publications

References 3 publications

The perception of self-produced sensory stimuli in patients with auditory hallucinations and passivity experiences: evidence for a breakdown in self-monitoring

The perception of self-produced sensory stimuli in patients with auditory hallucinations and passivity experiences: evidence for a breakdown in self-monitoring

The case for the comparator model as an explanation of the sense of agency and its breakdowns

Agency, gait and self-consciousness

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