Preconditions of Mayoral Leadership

Abstract

Observers of city politics have often stated that political leadership—usually mayoral leadership—is a crucial ingredient in a city's ability to deal with its problems. And studies of successful leaders in urban systems have led to the formulation of a model of the “political entrepreneur” who is adept at accumulating political resources and pyramiding them to gain increased influence. Based on four years of observation of politics in Oakland, California, this study suggests that successful mayoral leadership and resource-pyramiding may be limited by governmental structure, the personality of the mayor, and the nature of the political system.In Oakland, fragmented institutional authority and the council-manager form of government have created obstacles for elected officials. A privately oriented, “nonpolitical” mayor has avoided publicity and has tended to underutilize, rather than pyramid, his resources. Finally, in an amorphous political system characterized by a lack of group and party activity, a mayor is denied both information and support. By examining the ways in which the performance of Oakland's mayor diverges from a model of political leadership, we can identify some of the factors that support or limit such leadership.

Norwegian mayoral awareness of and attitudes towards climate change

“…The underlying question is whether each mayor's opinion is formed by private experiences or by the community as a whole. That topic has been studied for a long time [57]. It is obvious that opinions are formed by various factors and that, at the local political level, sometimes mayors lead public opinion and sometimes follow it.…”

Mayoral Leadership in Council-Manager Cities: Preconditions versus Preconceptions

“…Two of these examine the office from the strong executive perspective (Pressman, 1972;Sparrow, 1984), and two reflect the norms of council-manager cities in analyzing mayoral performance (Boynton and Wright, 1970;Wikstrom, 1979). A fifth includes council-manager cities in a general study of mayoral leadership (Kotter and Lawrence, 1974).…”

The Policy Role of City Managers: An Empirical Analysis of Cooperative Relationship in Policy Process between City Managers and Elected officials

“…Sparrow (1984:6) demonstrates that "decrease in the manager's power would result in increased mayor power." Also, Pressman (1972) concludes that the power relationship between elected officials and appointed officials can be described as a zero-sum game based on an analysis of the Oakland Case. However, the results of this study reverse these two perspectives, and could verify the existence of a "policy-making team" (Boynton and Wright, 1971:33).…”

“…Moreover, Svara (2001:180) concludes that "the complementarity of politics and administration holds that elected officials and administration both in regular communication with citizens need and help each other in a partnership for governance." In contrast to the negative perspectives of Sparrow (1984) and Pressman (1972), complementarity politics and administration between elected officials and appointed city managers enable local governments to escape from a zero-sum game of power struggle. Therefore, this study raises the following hypotheses:…”

“…Sparrow (1984) argues that an increase in the power of the city manager causes a decrease in the power of the mayor. Pressman (1972) also asserts this zero-sum relationship between mayors and city managers based on his field research. In contrast to these negative perspectives regarding the relationship, the policy-and performanceoriented environment of local government would reinforce a mutually supportive relationship among local government leaders.…”